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RESPONDING TO AN UNFORESEEN
VARIATION: WHY OHIO SHOULD PROVIDE A
STATUTORY RIGHT OF RESCISSION TO ALL
DEFRAUDED PARTIES IN A STOCK-FORSTOCK EXCHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This problem is further complicated by wide variations in administration,
not only from state to state, but sometimes from case to case in a single state.1
Consider two closely-held corporations in State O. They agree to
enter into an agreement whereby the shareholders of the acquiring
corporation, A, provide to the shareholders of the target corporation, T,
stock in corporation A in exchange for all stock and control in
corporation T.2 The owners of T are considering retirement. They are
seeking interest from parties looking to acquire their corporation. T
expresses interest, so the two parties enter into lengthy negotiations. A
ensures T that A has many lucrative contracts, is involved in substantial
growth and development, and has many stockholders; indeed, A
represents to T that this exchange will provide sufficient compensation
to T for T’s business.
However, after A and T agree to the terms of the exchange, T
becomes aware that A has grossly misrepresented the value of its
corporation’s stock. As it turns out, A’s corporation is in financial
disarray. A quickly depletes the assets it obtained from T, and the oncesuccessful business operations of T take a treacherous downward spiral
due to A’s misdealings. Left with nothing but worthless stock in A, the
former owners of T seek rescission of the agreement pursuant to O’s
state securities fraud statute in state court.
Next, imagine an identical scenario in State O with two other parties,
Y and Z.
Z, the target corporation, becomes aware of the
misrepresentations and misdealings of Y, the acquiring corporation.
However, instead of pursuing its state securities fraud action in state
court, Z brings federal securities claims in addition to its state securities
claims. As a result, Y and Z litigate in federal court in State O. Because
Alan M. Hoffman, Blue Skying an Issue, 13 HOW. L.J. 108, 108 (1967).
This hypothetical is inspired by the facts and resulting securities fraud lawsuit in
Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007). In Murphy, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed, with respect to this type of stock-for-stock transaction,
whether the sellers of the target company were to be considered “purchasers” entitled to
protection of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law. 498 F.3d at 391; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43
(West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. Assembly).
1
2
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the federal court must interpret the state securities claims as the state
court would, B and Z should expect similar treatment of their state
securities claims.
Securities fraud can be perpetrated in a number of ways.3 Based on
the plain language of Ohio Revised Code section 1707.43, the right of
rescission is limited to defrauded purchasers of securities.4 The statute
is, however, silent as to relief for parties in a stock-for-stock exchange in
which there is no clearly defined “purchaser” or “seller.”5 Construing
the statute as written, it is possible for a court to confront the situation of
either denying statutory relief to a party that is not a “purchaser,” or to
use a perilous, result-based approach to categorize the parties so that
they fit the language of the statute.6 This Note posits that this approach
of the courts is not needed. The necessity of statutory interpretation,
illustrated by inconsistent judicial reasoning, signals a need for change.7
Part II of this Note discusses the development of state Blue Sky Law,
and how the debate surrounding uniformity—both between states, and
also between state and federal regulatory agencies—has affected the
current configuration of securities fraud regulation.8 It concludes with
3
See “Securities Fraud Lawsuit” http://www.onlinelawyersource.com/stock_fraud/
securities-Lawuit.html (last visited on Aug. 19, 2008). Investors of securities who have
been harmed have the option of filing a securities fraud lawsuit. Id. The typical securities
fraud lawsuit is filed against “[s]ecurities brokers, dealers, financial advisors, securities
corporations, shareholders, and private investors . . . .” found to be responsible for fraud.
Id. There are four common types of fraud committed by stockbrokers and investment
advisors: churning (when a broker engages in “excessive transactions for the purpose of
generating commissions . . . for his own benefit rather than the benefit of the client[]”);
unsuitability (when a broker breaches his duty by making investments that are inconsistent
with the client’s “risk tolerance, needs and investment objectives[]”; over-concentration
(when a broker “puts too much of . . . [the client’s] portfolio in an individual investment
(such as the stock of a particular company) or type of investment (such as pharmaceutical
stocks)[]”); and misrepresentation/non-disclosure (when a broker “provides false or
misleading information to a client regarding an investment.”). “Types of Securities Fraud”
http://www.securities-fraud-attorneys.com/securities-fraud-types.htm (last visited Aug.
19, 2008). This Note focuses on misrepresentation and non-disclosure—specifically in the
instance of a stock-for-stock exchange.
4
§ 1707.43(A). With respect to the right of rescission, “every sale or contract for sale
made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the
purchaser.” Id. (emphasis added).
5
§ 1707.43.
6
See infra Part III.B (discussing how the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
broadly the plain meaning of section 1707.43 when providing the statutory right of
rescission to a target corporation acquired by means of a stock-for-stock exchange).
7
See infra Part IV (explaining how the author’s proposed statutory amendments to
section 1707.43 will provide a workable alternative to inconsistent judicial interpretation
caused by overly narrow construction of the statutory language).
8
See infra Parts II.A–B (exploring the development of state securities regulation, and
specifically Congress’s pro-uniformity legislation enacted to combat the lack of uniformity
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how a recent Sixth Circuit decision supports the argument for a
consistent, uniform application of state securities fraud regulation
statutes.9 Part III then addresses the effects of Congress’s decision to
grant fraud regulation to the states, and how the narrow scope of Ohio’s
Blue Sky Law provides an excellent example of how the dual regulatory
system allows for a statutory ambiguity as to who should receive the
protection of the Blue Sky Law.10 Part IV proposes an amendment to
section 1707.43 of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law to be used in determining which
parties should be provided the right of rescission when defrauded by
another party.11
II. BACKGROUND
It will be observed, therefore, that the law is a regulation of business,
constrains conduct only to that end, the purpose being to protect the public
against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon
them. Whatever prohibition there is, is a means to the same purpose, made
necessary, it may be supposed, by the persistence of evil and its insidious forms
and the experience of the inadequacy of penalties or other repressive measures.
The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is
aimed . . . “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of
‘blue sky[] . . . .’”12
To understand who should be entitled to the statutory right of
rescission under Ohio’s Blue Sky Law, it is necessary to explore the
broad and jagged landscape in which Ohio’s state securities regulations
operate. Part II.A of this Note focuses on the development of state Blue
Sky Law against the backdrop of increased federal securities
regulation.13 Next, Part II.B examines the effects of the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”) on states’

among state securities regulation statutes that caused substantial hardship and confusion
when attempting to comply with multiple, often inconsistent, statutes).
9
See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the interpretation of section 1707.43 by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and how this broad statutory interpretation was needed to account for a
transaction that fell outside the purview of the statutory language).
10
See infra Part III (analyzing how the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Murphy
construed the explicit language of section 1707.43 broadly, showing the need for clear,
consistent interpretation and application of Ohio’s antifraud provisions).
11
See infra Part IV (suggesting an expansion of the applicability of the right of rescission
from only purchasers to all parties acquiring securities by means of an exchange of
securities).
12
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the development state Blue Sky Law leading up to the
Uniform Securities Act of 1956).
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retention of jurisdiction in fraud actions.14 Last, Part II.C discusses Ohio
Blue Sky Law’s antifraud provisions, specifically how the recent Sixth
Circuit decision in Murphy v. Stargate Defense Systems Corp.15 supports
consistent legislation and interpretation of state Blue Sky Law
remedies.16 As a result of Murphy, the critical issue remains whether
both parties in a stock-for-stock exchange are afforded the remedies
currently available under Ohio Blue Sky Law.17
A. Uniform Securities Act of 1956: An Initial Approach to Uniformity
The argument for uniformity among state securities has been fertile
ground for substantial scholarship and debate.18 Although states have
See infra Part II.B (discussing why Congress enacted the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996 as a reaction to a lack of uniformity in the dual regulatory system
of securities regulation).
15
498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007).
16
See infra Part II.C (discussing Ohio’s antifraud provisions, remedies available to
buyers, and how Murphy raises the issue of interpreting which parties to a stock-for-stock
exchange are afforded these remedies).
17
See infra Part III.B.
18
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION VOL. 1 41–49 (3d ed. 1989)
(noting how, before the development of federal regulatory authorities, actors involved in
interstate securities business sought consistent, uniform regulation from state to state); see
Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 101, 105 (1997)
(discussing how the NSMIA’s preemption of state securities law is a step towards
uniformity, but because of the “duality of the American judicial system[,]” inconsistency
still remains among the states regarding authority to combat fraud); Hoffman, supra note 1,
at 108 (“The most difficult aspect of Blue Sky work is the lack of uniformity of the statutes,
both as to substantive and procedural matters.”); T. W. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil
Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: II, 34 CAL. L. REV. 344, 393 (1946)
(promoting uniformity among states because of the “stupendous, tedious and wasteful task
involved[]” in analyzing all state Blue Sky Law when attempting to ensure that a security
issue is in compliance with all applicable state statutes); see also Francis J. Facciolo &
Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The Continuing Viability of State Law Claims in the
Face of Primary Jurisdiction and Preemption Challenges Under The Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 525, 619 n.294 (1995) (discussing the appropriateness of
considering federal securities law concepts when construing Blue Sky statutory provisions
that are similar to the federal provisions); Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Thoughts on Borrowing
Federal Securities Jurisprudence under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S.C. L. REV. 243 (1987)
(discussing the benefits of maintaining uniformity between state and federal law, although
cautioning that this pursuit should not serve as a catch-all trump to the unique interests of
each state). But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, at 58 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). “It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory[] and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” Id. The authors, commenting on Justice Brandeis’s admonition of the Court’s
willingness to embrace notions of uniformity, comment that “[a]s a matter of principle, it is
difficult to justify the federal government’s telling the states that they cannot try to protect
14
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promulgated their own securities regulations, those states that have done
so have legislated against the backdrop of federal securities regulation.19
But even before the enactment of the first federal securities regulation in
the 1930s, a few states had already begun to adopt their own securities
regulations.20
Kansas is credited with passing the first state securities law in 1911.21
Motivated by the populist philosophy prevalent throughout the
Midwest, the Kansas Securities Act required registration of both
securities and securities salesmen.22 Between 1914 and 1916, despite this
their citizens beyond the federal disclosure philosophy.” Id. As the authors point out,
however, many who make this argument do not extend its application beyond disclosure
regulations. Id.
19
See Denos, supra note 18, at 105 (1997) (describing the following major sources of
federal securities legislation: The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (1933)
(regulating public offerings of securities, prohibiting offers and sales of unregistered
securities, and prohibiting fraudulent practices in any offer or sale of securities); and The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (1934) (established the Securities
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and extended federal regulation to trading in securities
already issued, in addition to many other provisions not critical to analysis in this Note).
See also Manning Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry: The Role of Merit
Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 129, 136–38 (1987). Warren argues that, despite the difference
in the scope of regulation, “overlap between the federal and state laws is likely to
continue.” Id. at 138. Even with this overlap, Warren continues, it “serves to fill in the
cracks where regulatory protection would not otherwise be provided.” Id. See also
Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against
Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495 (1984) (defending the dual system of regulation, and
generally arguing against federal preemption of state regulation).
20
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 29–41. The earliest, rudimentary statutes
sprung up in Massachusetts, California, Georgia, Missouri, Connecticut, Nevada, and
Rhode Island. Id. at 29–35. For example, the 1904 Georgia statute required
[C]ompanies selling “investment securities of any kind on the partial
payment, installment or any other plan of payment, and providing for
the redemption and retiring of the same, or any part thereof,” to
deposit in a trust company at least $25,000, to establish a redemption
fund of at least 75 percent of that amount collected in premiums, and
to file annual financial statements with the Comptroller General.
Id. at 30 (quoting 1904 Ga. Laws No. 592 at 74).
21
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 32.
22
See id. at 34. The Kansas Act provided:
[I]f said bank commissioner finds that such articles of incorporation or
association, charter, constitution and by-laws, plan of business or
proposed contract, contain any provision that is unfair, unjust,
inequitable or oppressive to any class of contributors, or if he decides
from his examination of its affairs that said investment company is not
solvent and does not intend to do a fair and honest business, and in his
judgment does not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds, or other
securities by it offered for sale, then he shall notify such investment
company in writing of his findings, and it shall be unlawful for such
company to do any further business in this state. . . .
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initial populist surge in favor of state regulation, federal district courts
were quite reluctant to uphold state securities statutes due to claims that
state regulation was unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.23 In
1917, however, the Supreme Court reversed course and upheld the Ohio,
South Dakota, and Michigan state statutes in the notorious “Blue Sky
Cases.”24 Now, more than 90 years later, each state and territory has
promulgated state securities regulation.25 Although there is a variety of
state statutes, many, if not most, are based on the Uniform Securities Act
of 1956.26
1.

The Uniform Securities Act of 1956—Background, Development, and
Influence

Prior to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956,27 Blue Sky Law varied
drastically from state to state.28 In fact, there were no identical acts prior
to 1956, and “the amount of variation and frequently unnecessary
complexity in both substance and verbiage [was] staggering.”29 But in

Id. at 34–35 n.22 (quoting 1911 Kansas Law ch. 133, § 5). Under the Kansas Act, fraudulent
activities were grounds for appointment of a receiver, and also were criminalized. Id. at 35
n.23. Within the first 18 months of enacting the statute, a large portion of the companies
that had been investigated had received permits. Id.
23
See generally LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 10 (1958), for a
discussion of the following cases in which the Iowa, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia,
and successive regulatory acts in Michigan were found to be in conflict with the federal
Constitution: Wm. R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 Fed. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1914); Geiger-Jones v.
Turner, 230 Fed. 233 (S.D. Ohio 1916); Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. v. Caldwell, (D. S.D.
1915); Bracey v. Darst, 218 Fed. 482 (N.D. W. Va. 1914); Alabama & New Orleans Transp.
Co. v. Doyle, 210 Fed. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1914); N. W. Halsey & Co. v. Merrick, 228 Fed. 805
(E.D. Mich. 1915).
24
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co.,
242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (in each of these
three cases, the Supreme Court upheld the state Blue Sky statutes as neither violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment nor unduly burdensome of interstate commerce).
25
50 State Statutory Surveys: Blue Sky Laws Securities Transactions (2007 Westlaw
50StateSurveysdatabase; then type “Surveys Offer Sale”) (reviewing State Blue Sky laws,
specifically the applicability of the regulations).
26
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66 n.89. There are 39 Uniform Securities Act
jurisdictions, and most have adopted section 101, the antifraud provision. Id.
27
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note
18, at 50–79.
28
See LOSS & COWETT, supra note 23, at 231 (noting how “a number of legislatures and
administrators have moved ahead independently in different ways[]”).
29
Id. at 18–19; see Hoffman, supra note 1, at 108.
The most difficult aspect of Blue Sky work is the lack of uniformity of
the statutes, both as to substantive and procedural matters. This
problem is further complicated by wide variations in administration,
not only from state to state, but sometimes from case to case in a single
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1956, the North American Securities Administrators Association
(“NASAA”) addressed this issue.30 NASAA promulgated the final draft
of the Uniform Securities Act after nearly 10 years of structuring “a new
uniform or model State Sale of Securities Act . . . to the end that the
existing diversity of legal requirements preliminary to the issuance of
securities be minimized to the greatest possible extent.”31 In 1978, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law sought a
revision of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act.32 But due to significant
disagreements arising out of the 1978 revision, the Conference began to
undertake a completely new draft in 1983.33 This new draft, the 1985
Uniform Securities Act,34 was not met with the same approval as its
predecessor in 1956.35 As a result, the 1956 Act has retained influence
state. However in recent years, several steps have been taken to
improve this situation.
Id. Hoffman notes that much has been done to improve the variation and complexity that
existed prior to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956. Id.
30
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46 (citing 72 ABA REP. 98, 297 (1947)). After the
1956 promulgation, the Act was approved by the American Bar Association and the North
American Securities Administrators, and endorsed by the SEC. Id. at 47–48. The Chairman
of the SEC had the following to say in support of the new Act:
I have been authorized to advise you that the Commissioners
unanimously concur in the principle of uniformity of laws among the
states with respect to the control of securities markets. With this
principle in mind, the Commission has unanimously endorsed the
proposed legislation. It is hoped that its enactment by the states will
bring about a better integration of the work of state securities
administrators with the work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Id. at 48 n.54.
31
Id. at 46 (citing 72 ABA REP. 98, 297 (1947)). See McWilliams, supra note 18, at 253 n.53
and accompanying text. McWilliams cites the standard policy provision of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law as follows:
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate
the interpretation and administration of this act with the related
federal regulation.
Id. Additionally, McWilliams points out that courts interpreting the Uniform Securities Act
have given weight to this purpose statement. Id.; see, e.g., Kansas State Bank v. Citizens
Bank, 737 F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir. 1984) (looking to the standard policy provision of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law when construing a provision
of the Kansas Act, which does not contain such a clear statement of purpose).
32
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 48.
33
Id.
34
Id., at 48.
35
Id. at 49. Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
approved the 1985 Uniform Act, it did not receive the same approval from the ABA. Id.; see
also Mark Sargent, Blue Sky Law: Some Thoughts on the Revised Uniform Securities Act, 14 SEC.
REG. L.J 62 (1986). Sargent notes that the Revised Uniform Securities Act was “not intended
to produce a radical transformation of blue sky law.” Id. at 64. Nevertheless, according to
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over the states’ legislation, illustrated by the fact that a majority of
jurisdictions that adopted the Act’s provisions did not do the same with
the 1985 Act.36 Key aspects of the 1985 Act left unenacted by the states
were the antifraud provisions.37
2.

Key Antifraud Provisions of the 1956 Act

It must be noted first that the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 is
divided into four parts, as follows: Part I deals with fraudulent and
other prohibited practices; Part II concerns registration of broker-dealers,
agents, and investment advisers; Part III encompasses registration of
securities; and Part IV includes general provisions, including
definitions.38 Each part is constructed so that it may stand alone.39
Indeed, the Act provided flexibility for states that chose to adopt only
certain provisions.40
Part I, “Fradulent and Other Prohibited Practices,” contains two
sections: section 101 outlaws fraudulent practices in connection with the
sale or purchase of a security; and section 102 concerns fraudulent and
other undesirable investment advisory activities.41 The language of
section 101 is as follows:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer,
sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are
Sargent, the Revised Uniform Securities Act can serve as a collection of new ideas that may
potentially “lay the foundation for some future resynthesis.” Id. at 74.
36
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 48.
37
See infra Part II.A.2.
38
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 51–60, for a more thorough analysis of these
four parts of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956. This note focuses on an analysis of Part I
of the Uniform Securities Act.
39
Id. at 50. The Act was so construed based upon the theory that “it was impractical to
expect complete uniformity among states with basically different regulatory philosophies,
but that there was some likelihood of achieving a substantial degree of uniformity among
those states that followed a particular philosophy.” Id. As a result, a state that wanted to
adopt, for example, the fraud provisions, was able to do so without adopting any other
sections, in part or in whole. Id. See id. at 171–225 for a more in-depth discussion of
regulatory philosophies.
40
See id. at 50–51.
41
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 101–02, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 62–63 n.83.
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made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.42
Working in conjunction with the antifraud provisions of section 101
are the provisions setting forth sanctions for unlawful conduct.43
Sections 409 and 410 establish criminal and civil liability, respectively,
for violations of section 101.44 Most critical to this Note’s ultimate
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958) (emphasis added), reprinted in LOSS
& SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 62 (emphasis added). The language of section 101 is
modeled after Federal Rule 10b-5 adopted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 62.
The language of Rule 10b-5, is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is as follows:
(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud or deceit
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of
the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act) by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use
of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000). It is worth noting that the language of section 501 of the 2002
Uniform Securities Act is identical to the language of section 101 of the 1956 Act. See JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE NEW UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (2003) for discussion and analysis of the
most current proposed state securities legislation. For purposes of this Note, however, the
focus is limited to the influence of the 1956 Act because it is the most widely adopted
version of the Act; see infra note 51.
43
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 63 nn.83–87 (discussing sanctions for unlawful
conduct in the 1956 Act, as well as similar provisions in the 1985 Revised Act).
44
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 409–10, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 64–65. Section 409 provides criminal penalties for willful violations of any
42
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analysis, however, is section 410.45 The protection of section 410 is
limited to “buyers” of securities.46 As a protected entity, a buyer is
permitted under section 410(a) to
[S]ue either at law or in equity to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with
interest at six per cent per year from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, less the
amount of any income received on the security, upon the
tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.47
Indeed, section 410 provides only buyers of securities with statutory
relief in an action for fraud.48 The Uniform Securities Act of 1956 is silent
regarding defrauded sellers.49
Based on this analysis and historical background of select provisions
of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, it is clear that states, in
promulgating Blue Sky securities legislation, have been encouraged to
provision of the Act. Id. Similarly, section 407(a) authorizes the securities administrator to
make public or private investigations of violations of the act, section 407(b) provides for
enforcement of court-ordered subpoenas, and section 408 authorizes the securities
administrator to seek an injunction from an appropriate court to enjoin violations of the
Act. Id.
45
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the rescission provision of OHIO R.C. § 1707.43 that is
explicitly limited to purchasers).
46
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary) (discussing the limitation to buyers as
appropriate in light of “the common-law and equitable remedies of deceit and rescission
which are available to the state courts without benefit of statute[]”).
47
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 65. In addition, section 410(b) defines who is liable:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions,
every employee of such a seller[,] . . . and every broker-dealer or agent
who materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as the seller, unless the non-seller who is so
liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of
the facts by reason of which liability is alleged to exist. There is
contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable.
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 410(b), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra
note 18, at 65.
48
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 65; see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT
§ 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary).
49
See generally UNIF. SECURITIES ACT 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 50–79.
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embrace uniformity.50
Among the 39 Uniform Securities Act
jurisdictions, 34 have adopted section 101.51 Additionally, four nonUniform Securities Act jurisdictions have done likewise.52 Although it
has not been unanimously adopted by the states, the Uniform Securities
Act of 1956 has experienced some success in promoting uniformity from

See supra Part II.A.
ALA. CODE § 8-6-17 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Reg. and First Spec. Sess.); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.55.010 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-507
(West, Westlaw through 2008 First Ex. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36b-4 (West, Westlaw
through 2008 Feb. Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (West, Westlaw through 76
Laws 2008, ch. 416); D.C. CODE § 31-5605.02 (West, Westlaw through July 7, 2008); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 30-14-501 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE § 23-19-5-1
(West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 502.501 (West, Westlaw
through 2008 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a501 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg.
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.320 (West, Westlaw through 2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-301 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAW ch.
110A, § 101 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Annual Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAW § 451.501
(West, Westlaw through P.A. 2008, No. 267 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 7571-501 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 557 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10301 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2007 Reg. Sess. and May 2007 Spec. Sess.); NEB REV.
STAT. § 8-1102 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.570
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess. and Spec. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:5
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 236 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. § 58-13B-30 (West,
Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8 (West, Westlaw through
S.L. 2008-23 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1-501 (West, Westlaw through 2008
Sec. Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.055, 135, 335, 345, 365 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg.
Sess.); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (West, Westlaw through Act 2008-18); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-501 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-121
(West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1 (West, Westlaw
through 2008 Gen Sess.); VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-502 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Spec.
Sess. I and II; WASH REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (West, Westlaw through 2008); W. VA. CODE
§ 32-1-101 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Ext. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-101 (West,
Westlaw through 2008 Budget Sess.); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 46101 (West, Westlaw
through P.L. 29-0003 (2007)); P.R. LAW ANN. tit. 10, § 851 (West, Westlaw through 2005).
52
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66–67, for a discussion of those jurisdictions
considered to be Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions. Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas,
and Vermont are non-Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions, but they have enacted securities
fraud provisions similar to § 101 of the 1956 Act. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 67
n.91. Ohio, which is not a Uniform Securities Act jurisdiction, has enacted OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.01(J) (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. Assembly),
expanding on the language of § 101, defining “fraud” as:
anything recognized on or after July 22, 1929, as such in courts of law
or equity; any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or to obtain money
or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise;
any fictitious or pretended purchase or sale of securities; and any act,
practice, transaction, or course of business relating to the sale of
securities that is fraudulent or that has operated or would operate as a
fraud upon the seller or purchaser.
Id.; see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
50
51
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state to state, at least with regard to antifraud provisions of the various
states’ Blue Sky Law.53
B. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996: A Call for
Uniformity?
Notwithstanding the positive impact of the Uniform Securities Act of
1956 on encouraging uniformity among states, the dual regulatory
system of securities regulation that encompassed both state and federal
regulation impeded investors, issuers, and regulators alike with
significant obstacles.54 Despite the challenges inherent in complying
with many different statutes in the case of a national securities offering,
for example, states have nevertheless continued to maintain a strong
interest in preserving their Blue Sky Law.55 Thus, it was within this

See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66–67.
See Denos, supra note 18, at 102. Denos discusses how many state provisions are “at
odds with comparable provisions at the federal level, . . . .” and also how those wishing to
comply with both sets of provisions are faced with multiple “layer[s] of red tape[.]” Id.
(footnote omitted). Additionally, Denos mentions the problem that arises when issuers
seek to comply with provisions of multiple states in a single securities offering. Id.
Ultimately, Denos contends that Congress’s intervention vis-à-vis the NSMIA was a
preemptive measure in favor of a single regulatory structure. See also Therese H. Maynard,
The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How “Uniform” is “Uniform”?—An Evaluation and
Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 359 (1987) (“The logistics and expense of
[complying with both sets of laws] can become so substantial that many small issuers
ultimately abandon or significantly scale back their efforts to obtain additional capital.”);
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L.
553 (1985) [hereinafter Campbell Jr., An Open Attack] (noting generally the challenges of
complying with various state Blue Sky Laws).
55
See Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 498–99 (1993)
[hereinafter Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law]. Sargent points out the interests of two
primary players in the state securities regulation arena: state regulators and state
governments. Id. He notes that state regulators and administrators “tend to regard
themselves as unusually committed to speaking for investors who cannot speak for
themselves.” Id. at 498. Pitted against this ideological motivation of state regulators and
administrators is what Sargent terms rather cynically the “cash cow[]” motivation. Id. at
499. Next, Sargent examines the “cash-starved state governments [who] are not likely to
surrender such a profitable source of revenues easily[]” as the second key example of the
states’ interest in maintaining securities regulation. Id. Thus, Sargent posits that the states
have a “deep[]” interest in Blue Sky Law that is rooted in revenue, but the specifics of the
interest, according to Sargent, is a matter of indifference to state governments. Id.; see also
Mark A. Sargent, The National Securities Markets Improvements Act—One Year Later.
Introduction, 53 BUS. LAW. 507 (1998) [hereinafter Sargent, NSMIA] (noting the concern, on
behalf of state regulators upon learning of early drafts of the NSMIA legislation, that
traditional state regulation would be eradicated in favor of uniform SEC regulation).
53
54
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complex framework of securities regulations that the regulatory
structure received a major overhaul in 1996.56
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996
(“NSMIA”) delegated exclusively to the SEC regulation of certain
activities related to the offering, promotion, and sale of nationally traded
securities.57 Most important for this Note’s analysis, however, is the
section of the NSMIA that did not delegate exclusive regulatory control
to the SEC; section 102(a) preserved the states’ power to prosecute fraud:
Consistent with this section, the securities commission
(or any agency or officer performing like functions) of
any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such
State to investigate and bring enforcement actions with
respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a
broker or dealer, in connection with securities or
securities transactions.58

See, e.g., JAMES HAMILTON, SECURITIES REFORM: NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996 LAW & EXPLANATION 9–13 (1999) (lamenting the complexities of
the dual regulatory structure as requiring excessive costs in arranging a nationwide
securities offering).
57
See The National Securities Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”), §§ 102–103, 15
U.S.C. § 77r (2000). By delegating certain responsibilities to the SEC, Congress exempted
areas for state control. Id. For example, in the area of broker-dealer regulation, the NSMIA
provides an exemption from state regulation for “de minimus transactions;” additionally,
the NSMIA declares securities issued by mutual funds under the exclusive control of SEC
regulation; finally, the SEC retains exclusive control of supervising investment advisors
who manage over $25 million; see also Denos, supra note 18, at 131 (describing the drastic
changes the NSMIA made in allocating the regulatory power between the SEC and the
states).
58
NSMIA § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2000). Despite the NSMIA’s profound impact
on the state-federal regulatory dynamic, however, it surely “fell short of a fundamental
reordering of the state-federal system of securities regulation and it certainly did not put
finis to almost a century of blue sky law.” Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55, at 507. Thus,
although “[t]he scope and weight of blue sky law has changed in important respects . . . the
state regulatory powers remain important.” Id. at 507–08; see Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.,
Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 203 (1997)
[hereinafter Campbell Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption] (positing that the changes
effected by the NSMIA are generally insignificant.). See also Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack,
supra note 54. Campbell, Jr. argues that even “state antifraud provisions should be
preempted in favor of federal antifraud provisions[.] . . . .” Id. at 575 (footnote omitted).
His argument is based on the premise that section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956
is substantially the same as Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the 1934 Securities Act. Id. at
576. Campbell, Jr. provides two reasons supporting preemption:
First, the state antifraud rules are fundamentally the same as the
federal antifraud rules[] . . . . As a result, compliance with federal
standards normally insures [sic] that an issuer is in compliance with
state standards[] . . . .
Second, compliance with state antifraud
56

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7

320

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

By enacting the NSMIA, Congress sought to clarify the responsibilities of
the SEC and the state regulatory agencies with the twin aims of
enhancing investor protection and reducing the costs of investing.59
Retaining the power to regulate fraud, states have considerable
leeway in the construction of their antifraud provisions.60 For example,
state civil liability statutes predicate antifraud recovery on various levels
of culpability, ranging from simple negligence61 to recklessness or
intent.62 However, this power in the hands of the state could prove
counter-productive to some of the preemptive effects of the NSMIA.63
Consequently, the state power, as a result of the NSMIA’s incomplete
preemption, has the potential to deliver a “severe blow to the uniformity
that is the policy basis for preemption.”64
These concerns aside, the NSMIA had a monumental impact on the
regulatory dynamic, even if the states did retain the power to enact their
own antifraud legislation.65 It was clear that the intent of Congress—in
essentially preempting the states’ Blue Sky Law (except for antifraud
legislation)—was to promote uniformity among the states.66 But in
allowing the states to retain antifraud jurisdiction, Congress appeared to

provisions does not require any filing or administrative approval as a
prerequisite to the completion of a proposed transaction.
Id. Campbell, Jr.’s argument is based on states’ duplication of the federal standards. Id.
He does, however, discuss the (unlikely) possibility that the states could define their
provisions differently from the federal provisions, but he views this only as further support
of his argument in favor of preemption of state antifraud provisions. Id. Campbell, Jr.
concludes that total preemption is the obvious alternative when many states merely mimic
the federal regulations, and when variations do nothing but generate costs in excess of any
societal benefit. Id.; see supra note 42 and accompanying text (comparing the language of
section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 with the language of Rule 10b-5). But see
Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55, at 498–99 (providing states’ motivations
for maintaining Blue Sky regulations).
59
See S. REP. NO. 104–293 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 104–864, at 39 (1996) (explaining that the
Act was intended to modernize “our scheme of securities regulation to promote
investment, decrease the cost of capital, and encourage competition[] . . . [in response
to] . . . the system of dual Federal and state securities regulation [that] resulted in a degree
of duplicative and unnecessary regulation[] . . . [and that] . . . in many instances, is
redundant, costly, and ineffective.”). But see Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption,
supra note 58, at 203 (cautioning against optimism that the NSMIA will achieve its goals).
60
See supra Part II.A.1.
61
See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text.
62
See Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58, at 201.
63
Id.
64
Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58, at 201; see Campbell, Jr.,
An Open Attack, supra note 54, at 575–77 (arguing in favor of complete federal preemption
of state antifraud regulation).
65
See supra notes 57–58.
66
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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defeat its own supposed goal of uniformity.67 As a result, the effects of
this incomplete preemption are a lack of uniformity and residual
confusion within the dual regulatory structure of antifraud regulation
provisions.68 Even after the NSMIA, antifraud regulation remains
inconsistent both between the states, as well as between the state and the
federal regulatory agencies, keeping alive the challenges and resulting
debates about the dearth of uniformity among state Blue Sky Law.
C. Development and Interpretation of Remedies for Securities Fraud Under
Ohio Blue Sky Law
Following Kansas’s lead in 1911, Ohio enacted Blue Sky securities
legislation in 1913.69 The 1913 law established a three-part approach to
regulating securities: first, the law established a licensing requirement
for securities dealers; second, the law required registration of the
securities; and third, the 1913 law established prohibitions and penalties
for violation of the law.70 And as mentioned above, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio’s 1913 law in the
1917 “Blue Sky Cases.”71
Notwithstanding the approval of the United States Supreme Court,
the Ohio law initially received its fair share of criticism.72 Responding to
such criticism, the 1929 Ohio Securities Act revised the 1913 law.73 After
this revision, those critical of the 1913 law quickly changed their views.74
Praising the 1929 Securities Act was one previous dissenter, a satisfied,
contemporary businessman, who suggested that the new law was “a law
which will not only throw the crooks for a loss but will, at the same time,
cut away the entangling meshes of red tape and allow legitimate
See Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58.
See Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55.
69
See Thomas E. Geyer, Viewing the Columbus Skyline: Incorporating Federal Law into the
Anti-Fraud Standard of the Ohio Securities Act, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 303 (1996). Geyer cites
the 1926 decision The Warren People’s Market Co. v. Corbett & Sons for the notion that the
legislators in 1913 “enacted the Ohio ‘Blue Sky Law’ in 1913 to ‘regulate the sale of bonds,
stocks, and other securities . . . and to prevent fraud in such sales.” Id. (quoting The
Warren People’s Market Co. v. Corbett & Sons, 151 N.E. 51, 55 (Ohio 1926)).
70
See Geyer, supra note 69, at 303–04.
71
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
72
See Geyer, supra note 69, at 303. Criticism was rooted in the typical laissez faire
arguments launched against government regulation of commerce. Id. at 304. Geyer cites
one unhappy securities practitioner who complained of the statute’s potential to harass
business. Id.
73
See id. at 303. The 1929 Ohio Securities Act had the effect of essentially repealing the
entire 1913 code. Id. In fact, as Geyer notes, the 1929 Act added almost an entire new
chapter to the Code. Id.
74
See id.
67
68

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7

322

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

business to swoop gracefully down the field for a touchdown.”75 The
new law stayed true to the original twin aims of investor protection and
encouragement of capital development by re-working the regulatory
structure that had served to handcuff both the “crooks” and the
legitimate securities dealers alike.76 In fact, the 1929 Act was so
successful that it has remained structurally unchanged by the current
Ohio Securities Act.77
1.

Ohio’s Interpretation of Fraud

After the NSMIA’s preemption of much state regulatory power,
what remains of Ohio’s Blue Sky securities regulations is the power to
prosecute fraud.78 Even though much state power is preempted by
federal regulations, preventing exploitation of investors through the sale
of fraudulent securities remains the primary focus of state regulators—
just as it was at the time of enacting both the 1913 and 1929 Ohio
Securities Acts.79

Id. at 303 (quoting J. C. Little, The New Ohio Securities Act, CLEV. BAR ASS’N J. 5, 5 (Oct.
1929)).
76
See supra note 69; see also Geyer, supra note 69, at 305 (discussing capital development).
77
Geyer, supra note 69, at 305.
78
See supra Part II.B.
79
See Geyer, supra note 69, at 301 n.1 (quoting Ohio State Bar Association Corporation
Law Committee Comments Accompanying the 1929 Amendments to the Ohio Securities
Act, reprinted in HOWARD FRIEDMAN, OHIO SECURITIES LAW & PRACTICE 23 (Supp. 1994)).
The proposed act gives to the Division of Securities broadly inclusive
powers as to fraud . . . . We believe that this law, as we have drafted it,
will not unduly restrict the activities of honest men dealing in honest
securities, and that it will provide the means by which deceptive acts
can be discovered, prevented and punished.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550–51 (1917)
(upholding the constitutionality of the former Ohio Blue Sky Law in regulating the sale of
securities). See also United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966). Upholding a
prior challenge to the constitutionality of the Ohio Securities Act, the Sixth Circuit
discussed the reasons for having antifraud provisions in the first place:
The power of the State to provide for the general welfare authorizes it
to establish such regulations as will secure or tend to secure the people
against ignorance often due from an incomplete disclosure of facts by
one in the unique position to know the facts. The Ohio Securities Act
[of 1929], commonly referred to as Ohio Blue Sky Law, was adopted to
prevent fraudulent exploitations through the sale of securities.
Id. See also Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio 1968).
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the necessities of the antifraud provisions:
[T]he purpose . . . is to prevent those persons willing to market
worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the
purchasing public without first subjecting themselves and their
securities to reasonable licensing and registration requirements
75
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Because Ohio is not a Uniform Securities Act jurisdiction, it tends to
define “fraud” more broadly than the aforementioned Uniform
Securities Act jurisdictions.80 Coinciding with the NSMIA, in a 1996 case,
In re Columbus Skyline Securities, Inc.,81 the Ohio Supreme Court had the
opportunity to interpret the state constitutionality of Ohio’s antifraud
provision.82 The Columbus Skyline court considered the co-existence of
designed to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility and
avariciousness.
Id.
80
OHIO R.C. § 1701.01(J) (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen.
Assembly). The language defining “fraud” is more expansive than the proposed language
of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956:
“Fraud,” “fraudulent,” “fraudulent acts,” “fraudulent practices,” or
“fraudulent transactions” means anything recognized on or after July
22, 1929, as such in courts of law or equity; any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of any
false pretense, representation, or promise; any fictitious or pretended
purchase or sale of securities; and any act, practice, transaction, or
course of business relating to the sale of securities that is fraudulent or
that has operated or would operate as a fraud upon the seller or
purchaser.
Id. To constitute fraud, one must be engaged in selling securities. State v. Walsh, 420
N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). The Court in Walsh distinguished an act or practice
in connection with the sale of the security from an act or practice “subsequent to the sale.”
Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, in 1982, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that
fraud, for purposes of securities regulation, is not the same as criminal fraud, as defined in
section 2912.01(K). State v. Trivedi, 457 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). As a result, the
Court held that restitution was not appropriate. Id. But in the 1996 case State v. Clark, the
same court held that Trivedi had been implicitly overruled by a previous decision, and
concluded that restitution, in fact, was appropriate. No. C-960103, 1996 WL 741972 (Ohio
App. 1 Dist. Dec. 31, 1996).
81
Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660
N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1996); see Geyer, supra note 69. Geyer discusses the significance of the
Columbus Skyline decision in that few courts have incorporated federal standards into state
law. Geyer, supra note 69, at 314. Additionally, Geyer discusses how this decision confirms
the states’ retention of power to prosecute fraud, noting, “[i]n reaffirming the dual nature
of securities regulation, the NSMIA . . . fully sanctions the expansive reach of state
securities anti-fraud authority.” Id. at 317. Geyer concludes his support of the Columbus
Skyline decision by noting that this incorporation “permits maximum enforcement, uniform
application and the maintenance of an appropriate balance between investor protection
and capital formation.” Id.
82
Columbus Skyline, 660 N.E.2d at 428–29. The precise issue here was whether section
1707.01(J) gives to intrastate securities dealers adequate notice that federal case law may be
used (to calculate the current market price of over-the-counter stock) to determine if the
dealer’s conduct is fraudulent. Id. at 428. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute, but Columbus Skyline is most relevant for its analysis of the
reasoning behind the drafting of the statute. Id. at 429. Citing the definition of “fraud” in
section 1707.01(J), the Court emphasizes the key language of the first clause, “anything
recognized on or after July 22, 1929, as such in courts of law or equity[.]” Id. at 428. The Court
was faced with a challenge for vagueness on the grounds that this language was too broad
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Ohio’s Blue Sky law with federal securities regulation—specifically the
expansive nature of Ohio’s statutory language.83 Keeping in line with
the dual-regulatory structure, the Court was unwilling to grant exclusive
jurisdiction in antifraud matters to either state or federal regulatory
agencies.84 Rather, the Court determined that it was necessary for state
law to work in conjunction with federal regulations in determining what
constitutes fraudulent behavior.85 Indeed, Columbus Skyline is illustrative
of the state-federal securities regulatory dichotomy in that it
demonstrates the willingness of the Ohio courts to construe “fraud”
broadly, and thus equitably, in maintaining and promoting the goals of
the original Ohio Securities Act.86 And despite the difference in the
general language of the statute, the Ohio fraud statute operates to treat
fraud in a fashion quite similar to other state law.87 Having thus laid the
and far-reaching. Id. But in disagreeing with the lower court, which held that “[a] general
rule stating that federal securities law applies to Ohio intrastate securities trading would be
insufficient as it would be impossible for anyone to know what standard applied[,]” the
Ohio Supreme Court emphasized a liberal construction of the antifraud provisions in order
to further the protectionist goals of the statute. Id. at 429. The Court thus found it
necessary to construe the statute so broadly because it was drafted “to address unforeseen
variations in factual circumstances.” Id.
83
Id. at 429. The Court discussed the necessity of creating such sweeping language in
order “to address unforeseen variations in factual circumstances.” Id. Discussing the
evolving nature of fraudulent conduct—specifically the “creativity of unscrupulous
securities dealers intent on defrauding Ohio investors[]”—the Court noted that the
lawmakers defined the statute so broadly so as not to exclude potentially fraudulent
conduct. Id. Then, the Court provided two specific reasons as to why the legislators
defined “fraud” in such generalities: first, “[b]y incorporating into the statute a larger body
of law by which to define fraudulent conduct, the General Assembly has provided for
inevitable changes in market structure that might otherwise require redrafting of the
statute[;]” second, federal standards are often more developed than state standards, and by
allowing this incorporation, the state lawmakers prudently differ to the more specialized
SEC in certain matters. Id. at 429–30.
84
Id. at 429.
[T]he General Assembly did not limit the source of the definition [of
certain measuring standards] solely to courts of Ohio, or even to state
courts generally, as it easily could have done. Rather, the legislature
broadly drafted R.C. 1707.01(J) to draw from all securities case law
defining fraudulent conduct in both state and federal courts.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 430; see also United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966); Bronaugh v.
R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1968).
87
See State v. Walsh, 420 N.E.2d 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (finding criminal liability for
fraud when a person represents facts to be different than he should have known them to be
if he had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to ascertain the facts). Following the
lead of Walsh, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified its meaning of the due diligence standard
for fraud in 1990:
First, it must be ascertained whether defendant exercised reasonable
diligence to ascertain the true state of facts; and, second, it must be
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foundation for Ohio’s general securities fraud regulation, this Note now
shifts its focus to the issue of remedies in an unlawful sale—specifically
the statutory language defining precisely who is afforded the remedies
of section 1707.43.
2.

Buyers’ Remedies

Since the NSMIA was promulgated in 1996, Ohio has retained the
power to prosecute violators of securities fraud.88 To this end, Ohio
provides defrauded investors with statutory relief.89 Specifically, redress
is available under sections 1707.41,90 1707.42,91 and 1707.4392 of the Ohio

determined whether he should, not merely could, have learned of the
true facts in the exercise of reasonable diligence. This is not a situation
where one fact is presumed to exist because of the existence of another;
but, instead in the context of this case, the jury is required to make a
factual determination of whether the defendant represented the facts
to be different than he should have known them to be, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence.
This in no way infringes upon the
presumption of innocence, since the state is required to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known the facts to be different than he
represented them to be. Actually, there is little difference between this
standard and the standard that is ordinarily used, since it is
permissible to infer that a defendant has knowledge of facts which he
should have known under the circumstances involved.
State v. Warner, 564 N.E.2d 18, 42 (Ohio 1990).
88
See supra Part II.B.
89
See Thomas E. Geyer, Michael P. Miglets, & Keith A. Rowley, Civil Liability and
Remedies in Ohio Securities Transactions, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 939 (2002). The authors note that
Ohio common law supplements the Ohio Securities Act. Id. at 940. The authors go on to
describe how the state law has grown in importance after the NSMIA, which contributed to
reduc[ing] the number of avenues by which plaintiffs relying on
federal law may pursue alleged wrongdoers for securities fraud,
impos[ing] significant additional requirements on plaintiffs suing
under federal securities law, . . . and curb[ing] the availability of state
courts as an alternative forum in which plaintiffs may pursue
securities fraud claims.
Id. at 941 (quoting Keith A Rowley, Muddy Waters, Blue Skies: Civil Liability Under the
Mississippi Securities Act, MISS. L. J. 683, 684 (2000)). Consequently, the authors argue, Ohio
law may nevertheless present “attractive alternatives” in the form of state common law
fraud claims. Id.; see Robert L. Matia, Express and Implied Civil Liability Provisions in State
Blue Sky Laws, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1173 (1966) (discussing the multitude of available
remedies to purchasers in securities transactions). See generally Dale C. LaPorte, Note,
Voidability Provisions Under State Blue Sky Laws, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1148 (1966)
(discussing the voidability remedy under both federal and state regulations, and arguing
that the protection afforded buyers is adequate).
90
OHIO REVISED.CODE. ANN. § 1707.41 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly) provides, in pertinent part:
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Revised Code. Stemming from the Code’s definition of fraud, section
1707.43 provides the primary source of remedies for the purchaser in an
unlawful sale.93
(A) In addition to the other liabilities imposed by law, any person
that, by a written or printed circular, prospectus, or advertisement,
offers any security for sale, or receives the profits accruing from such
sale, is liable, to any person that purchased the security relying on the
circular, prospectus, or advertisement, for the loss or damage
sustained by the relying person by reason of the falsity of any material
statement contained therein or for the omission of material facts,
unless the offeror or person that receives the profits establishes that the
offeror or person had no knowledge of the publication prior to the
transaction complained of, or had just and reasonable grounds to
believe the statement to be true or the omitted facts to be not
material. . . .
....
(C) For purposes of this section, lack of reasonable diligence in
ascertaining the fact of a publication or the falsity of any statement
contained in it or of the omission of a material fact shall be deemed
knowledge of the publication and of the falsity of any untrue statement
in it or of the omission of material facts.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly) provides, in pertinent part:
(A) Whoever, with the intent to secure financial gain to self, advises
and procures any person to purchase any security, and receives any
commission or reward for the advice or services without disclosing to
the purchaser the fact of the person’s agency or interest in such sales,
shall be liable to the purchaser for the amount of the purchaser’s
damage thereby, upon tender of the security to, and suit brought
against, the adviser, by the purchaser.
Id.
92
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly) provides, in pertinent part:
(A) Subject to divisions (B) [statute of limitations] and (C) [correction
of error by seller] . . . , every sale or contract for sale made in violation
of Chapter 1707. of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the
purchaser. The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every
person that has participated in or aided the seller in any way in
making such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to
the purchaser, in an action at law in any court of competent
jurisdiction, upon tender to the seller in person or in open court of the
securities sold or of the contract made, for the full amount paid by the
purchaser and for all taxable court costs, unless the court determines
that the violation did not materially affect the protection contemplated
by the violated provision.
Id.
93
See James B. Farmer & Toba Jeanne Feldman, Fraud in Securities Transactions: A
Comparison of Civil Remedies Under the Ohio Securities Act, the Uniform Securities Act, and the
Federal Securities Acts, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 814, 820–21 (1980). The authors note the relatively
narrow scope of section 1707.41. Id. at 820. Because the section applies only to
91
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As the statutory remedy, section 1707.43’s protective umbrella is
limited to purchasers of securities; indeed, it fails to provide statutory
relief for defrauded sellers.94 Armed with this statutory protection, a
purchaser has the right to elect to void a sales contract that violates any
provision of the Ohio Securities Act.95 Conversely, the statute fails to
provide a statutory remedy for defrauded sellers.96 Moreover, as a frame
of reference, the statutory language of Ohio’s corporate merger statute is
much broader in providing remedies to parties that have been the
victims of fraud.97 It is from this starting point that this Note proceeds to

“misrepresentations or omissions made in printed material utilized in the sale of a
security[,]” its usefulness is “limited.” Id. Additionally, “[o]nly a defrauded purchaser
may seek relief under the statute, upon proof of materiality, negligence and reliance.” Id.
Likewise, section 1707.42 is also limited, as it “contains a scienter requirement and applies
only to financial advisors.” Id.; see also Matia, supra note 89.
94
Compare UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65, with OHIO R.C. § 1707.43.
95
§ 1707.43; see Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93 (discussing how only purchasers are
granted the statutory right of rescission).
96
See Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93, at 822. The authors raise a compelling
question—a question that, in fact, this Note aims to discuss in Part IV, with the facts of the
stock-for-exchange transaction in Murphy as the springboard—“Because misstatements and
omissions can just as easily induce a sale as a purchase,” why is not the statute expanded to
provide a civil remedy for defrauded sellers? Id. at 822.
97
OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.78 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen.
Assembly) is Ohio’s corporate merger statute:
(D) To effect the merger or consolidation, the agreement shall be
approved by the directors of each domestic constituent corporation,
adopted by the shareholders of each domestic constituent corporation,
other than the surviving corporation in the case of a merger, at a
meeting of the shareholders of each such corporation held for the
purpose, and approved or otherwise authorized by or on behalf of
each foreign constituent corporation in accordance with the Law of the
state under which it exists. In the case of a merger, the agreement shall
also be adopted by the shareholders of the surviving corporation at a
meeting held for the purpose, if one or more of the following
conditions exist: . . .
....
(3) The merger involves the issuance or transfer by the surviving
corporation to the shareholders of the other constituent corporation or
corporations of such number of shares of the surviving corporation as
will entitle the holders of the shares immediately after the
consummation of the merger to exercise one-sixth or more of the
voting power of that corporation in the election of directors[] . . . .
Id. In the case of fraud perpetrated during the course of such a transaction, OHIO REV.
CODE § 1701.93 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. Assembly), in
pertinent part, provides general prohibitions and penalties:
(A) No officer, director, employee, or agent of a corporation shall,
either alone or with another or others, with intent to deceive:
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explore section 1707.43 in terms of the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in
Murphy v. Stargate Defense Systems Corp.98
3.

Murphy’s Law

Murphy considers the subtle issue of precisely who is entitled to
statutory protection under Ohio’s Blue Sky Law, specifically the
rescission provision of section 1707.43(A).99 Appellants (Plaintiffs at the
trial court level) were owners of Spectrum Infrared, Inc. (“Spectrum”).100
In 2005, Appellants sold all shares of Spectrum to Stargate Defense
Systems Corp. (“Stargate”), a business operated by the Appellees
(Defendants at the trial court level).101 The sale was structured as a stock
exchange whereby the Appellants traded all their stock in Spectrum for
stock in Stargate, essentially acquiring an interest in Stargate while
relinquishing control of Spectrum.102 Unfortunately for Appellants,
however, their acquired stock interest in Stargate turned out to be worth
no value.103
(1) Make, issue, deliver, publish, or send by mail or by any other
means of communication any prospectus, report, circular, certificate,
statement, balance sheet, exhibit, or document, respecting the shares,
assets, liabilities, capital, business, dividends or distributions, earnings,
or accounts of a corporation, that is false in any material respect,
knowing the statement to be false; . . .
....
(B) Whoever violates this section shall be personally liable, jointly and
severally, with all other persons participating with the offender in any act of
that type, to any person for any damage actually suffered and proximately
resulting from the act. . . .
(D) Remedies under this section are not exclusive of other remedies at
common law or under other statutes.
Id. (emphasis added). From the general language of section 1707.93(B), it appears that the
applicability of these corporate fraud statutes is not limited to just one party in the
transaction. But see § 1701.43 (the language of the statute limits the applicability to
purchasers of securities).
98
Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007) (the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied section 1707.43, fraud during the purchase of securities, in a
stock-for-stock exchange; sections 1707.78 and 1707.93, Ohio’s corporate merger statutes,
were not considered in Murphy).
99
Id. at 390.
100
Id. at 388.
101
Id. In addition, plaintiffs agreed to purchase stock from defendants in two
transactions independent of the 2005 acquisition. Id. at 388–89. See infra note 93 (a
description of the dealings between Plaintiffs Murphy and Smith and Defendant
Woodruff).
102
Id. at 388.
103
Id. at 389. The trial court made many specific findings of fact; those that follow serve
to illustrate the nature of the fraud perpetrated by Stargate Defense Systems against
Plaintiffs John Murphy and James Smith. Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., No. 1:05
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CV 2121, 2006 WL 721746, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2006), aff’d in part, denied in part, 498
F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007). Murphy and Smith were each 50 percent shareholders in
Spectrum, an Ohio corporation that manufactured infrared heaters used for a variety of
commercial applications. Id. Contemplating retirement, the Plaintiffs advertised the
availability of their manufacturing business. Id. Shortly thereafter, Defendant James
Woodruff responded to the advertisement and requested additional information. Id.
Nearly six months later Woodruff represented to Smith that his corporation, Q Corp, was
going public soon, and he was still interested in acquiring Spectrum. Id. at *2. During a
meeting between Murphy and Woodruff, Woodruff represented that Q Corp did 60
percent of its business with the United States Government, and that Q Corp was in the
process of acquiring another business for 1.5 million dollars. Id. On January 4, 2002,
Woodruff and Mitchell visited Spectrum’s facility in Cleveland, Ohio and met with
Murphy and Smith. Id. at *2. At this meeting, Woodruff represented that Q Corp was in
the process of acquiring yet another company—a gas infrared manufacturing company
business with sales of $400,000 per year. Id. Murphy sent to Woodruff an appraisal of the
Spectrum equipment, as well as a breakdown of Spectrum’s sales. Id. Woodruff then
called Murphy, and left a phone message representing to Murphy that Q Corp was in the
process of going public, and that Woodruff was interested in purchasing Spectrum with
stock. Id. Woodruff further suggested that Murphy should consider making a small
investment in Q Corp stock as part of the deal. Id. Murphy, Smith, and Plaintiff’s personal
accountant met with Woodruff at the offices of Q Corp, during which time Woodruff
represented that Q Corp had a net worth of 3.5 million dollars, and that shares were selling
at $15 per share. Id. On January 25, 2002, Murphy and Smith agreed to purchase jointly
400 shares of Q Corp and tendered a check payable to Q Corp in the amount of $12,000;
despite this payment, no stock certificates were ever delivered. Id. Murphy requested
additional information from Woodruff regarding Q Corp; in response, Woodruff corrected
his earlier misstatement and represented to Murphy that Q Corp stock had never sold for
less than $30 per share. Id. at *3. On February 1, 2002, Murphy and Smith delivered the
signed copy of the letter of intent and Woodruff represented that everything was in place
to close on another acquisition. Id. On February 4, 2002, Murphy purchased an additional
1,000 shares of Q Corp for $20,000; no stock certificates were delivered. Id. The trial court
found that Woodruff made several misrepresentations to Murphy, including that he had no
plans to take Q Corp public. Id. In addition, Woodruff had been prosecuted for many
previous fraudulent schemes involving investors. Id. On March 1, 2002, the Certificate of
Incorporation of Q Corp was cancelled for failure to file annual reports and the nonpayment of taxes to the State of Delaware. Id. at *4. On February 20, 2002, Woodruff
delivered to Murphy and Smith Q Corp’s Profit and Loss Statements, Balance Sheets, and a
Prospectus for Q Corp. Id. This prospectus included an amalgamation of several
corporations, financial information based on these entities, and various other information
regarding the business activities of Q Corp. Id. Woodruff explained to Murphy that he
anticipated better performance in 2002, and was now waiting for money to complete the
acquisition of Spectrum. Id. at *5. Murphy and Woodruff made a number of
communications throughout the remainder of 2002, and in March of 2003, Plaintiffs
decided to resume their advertisement of Spectrum; they never received any serious
interest, however. Id. at *6. But in June 2003, Woodruff called Murphy to assure him that
he would have the available funds in a matter of weeks, and “they would need to get
serious about completing the acquisition of Spectrum[.]” Id. Having assured Murphy that
Q Corp was in a position to complete the acquisition, Woodruff presented Murphy and
Smith stock certificates representing their ownership in Stargate Defense Systems (a
Delaware Corporation formerly known as Interwoven Technologies), as well as a copy of a
purchase agreement. Id. at *6. Plaintiffs executed the purchase agreement, but consulted
an attorney on March 18, 2005. Id. Plaintiffs suggested that the contract should be between

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7

330

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Upon suspecting Stargate’s fraud, Murphy filed suit against Stargate
seeking to rescind the transaction pursuant to section 1707.43(A).104 The
District Court granted Murphy the right of rescission of previous stock
purchases, but denied them rescission of the 2005 stock exchange.105 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district
court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs were not stock “purchasers,” and
reversed the decision in part accordingly.106

Plaintiffs as individual shareholders of Spectrum and Stargate rather than between
Spectrum and Stargate, but Woodruff rejected this proposed change. Id. at *7. The
Purchase Agreement provided that Stargate would purchase all of the stock, assets, and
business or product lines owned and conducted by Spectrum for $1,008,000.00 in the form
of shares of Stargate stock which is valued at $30.00 per share. Id. When Murphy and
Smith were issued shares in Stargate in March of 2005, no such corporation known as
Stargate existed on record in either Delaware or Ohio. Id. Defendants were aware, but did
not disclose, that Stargate was not qualified for holding a government contract because of
Defendants’ previous indictments for fraud. Id. Despite the inconsistencies in the stock
certificates, representations made about products and acquisitions, and the previous
indictments and sentencing of Woodruff, Plaintiffs did not begin to suspect until June 2005
that that a fraud had been perpetrated upon them because the Defendants isolated the
Plaintiffs and their former employees from the corporate records and the operations of
Stargate. Id. at *8. During the period in which Stargate acquired the operations of
Spectrum, Spectrum received cancellation of its insurance coverage for nonpayment of its
premiums and a a demand letter for two months rent in arrears, and Stargate began to run
its payroll through Spectrum because Stargate had no money coming in and its bank
account balances were negative. Id. at *9. Additionally, suppliers of Spectrum indicated
that accounts had become past due, and they threatened to cut off critical supplies. Id.
Finally, on August 3, 2005, Plaintiffs tendered their share certificates into the court, and
requested rescission of the stock sales. Id.
104
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 388. Central to Plaintiffs complaint is their allegation that they
were induced to enter the transactions as a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations and
omissions made by Defendants. Id. Plaintiffs brought federal claims in addition to their
state statutory and common law claims. Id. Their allegations charged defendants with
violations of federal Rule 10b-5, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.44, and Ohio common law.
Id. The only issue on appeal, however, concerns the scope of Ohio’s Blue Sky law, OHIO
REV.CODE ANN §§ 1701.01–99, specifically whether the Plaintiffs were “purchasers” for
purposes of the right of rescission available under section 1707.43. Id.
105
Murphy, 2007 WL 721746 at *1. In a brief footnote, the district court addressed the
issue of whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to protection under the Ohio Blue Sky law. Id.
at *12. Determining that, in fact, Plaintiffs were not purchasers, the district court relied on
the well-settled law of Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. Nickels expounds clearly the
standard: “The blue sky law provides a remedy only for a defrauded purchaser, and not
for a defrauded seller.” 541 F.2d at 616. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found error in the
district courts failure to examine the specifics of the transaction, i.e., a stock-for-stock
transaction, in determining who, in fact, is the “purchaser” and who is the “seller.”
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.
106
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391 (reversing the district court with respect to its denial of
Plaintiffs’ right of rescission under section 1707.43).
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Although Murphy conceded that Nickels v. Koehler Management
Corp.107 precludes Blue Sky protection for defrauded sellers, they argued
that both parties acted as stock purchasers in the 2005 stock exchange,
and therefore are entitled to protection under section 1707.43.108 After
reviewing the purpose of the Ohio Blue Sky Law,109 the Sixth Circuit
court rested its analysis on the unique nature of the stock exchange in
which both parties essentially purchased shares in a different
corporation.110 The court relied on Indemnity Insurance Co. of North
America v. Kircher111 in distinguishing the stock-for-stock transaction
from the typical buy-sell transaction to which the statutory language
specifically referred.112 Thus, it is this critical distinction for which the
district court failed to account when it simply ignored the pressing
question: who, for purposes of Blue Sky protection, was the actual
seller?113
After Murphy, there is uncertainty when it comes to who is afforded
the protection of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law as illustrated by the disagreement
in interpretation between the District Court and the Sixth Circuit.114 The
Sixth Circuit held narrowly that, in the instance of this stock-for-stock
exchange, both parties are afforded the remedy of rescission when the
other acts fraudulently.115 It is within this framework that this Note
proceeds to analyze the implications of the Murphy ruling for future
securities-fraud actions in the unique case of a defrauded “seller” in a

541 F.2d 611.
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.
109
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
110
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. Holding that “plaintiffs should be regarded as purchasers for
purposes of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law[,]” the court then examined the meaning of “sale” in a
securities transaction: “‘The sale of a security . . . means among other things an exchange of
securities, and as one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who
acquires by an exchange of securities.’” Id. (quoting Indem Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher,
191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934)). See Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 467–68 (1969) (quoting Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1967)
(holding that, “in a merger, shareholders . . . effectively purchas[ing] shares in a new
corporation while ‘losing their status as shareholders’ in the previous corporation[]”);
Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 160 (6th Cir. 1968) (quoting Dasho, 380 F.2d at 269) (holding
that, in the context of a federal securities fraud claim, “when the merger was approved and
the exchange of securities occurred, the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new
security and paid for it by turning in his old one[]”).
111
191 N.E. at 376.
112
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.
113
See generally Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., No. 1:05 CV 2121, 2006 WL
721746.
114
See supra note 106 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of the lower court’s decision
to deny the seller of stock the statutory right of rescission when defrauded by a buyer).
115
Murphy, 498 F.3d 386 at 391.
107
108
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stock-for-stock exchange.116 To this end, Part III examines the relevancy
of the uniformity debate, how the Sixth Circuit court’s interpretation of
Ohio’s Blue Sky Law in Murphy has effectively expanded the protection
afforded to parties seeking securities-fraud remedies, and ultimately,
whether there is a need to amend section 1707.43 to include a statutory
right of rescission in a stock-for-stock exchange.117
III. ANALYSIS
Because misstatements and omissions can just as easily induce a sale as a
purchase, the state statutes should be expanded to provide a civil remedy for
defrauded sellers.118
With a history dominated by a dual regulatory structure, it is clear
that no mandatory uniform standards exist among states in their
securities fraud regulation.119 As a result, states have defined fraud
uniquely, and additionally, made available specific remedies to victims
of fraud.120 Despite a movement towards uniformity, however, the effort
has fallen short of achieving its goal—specifically among the various
state antifraud statutes.121
As a case-in-point, Ohio has limited the right of rescission in
securities fraud actions to buyers of stock.122 In determining how to
interpret Ohio’s Blue Sky law in terms of stock exchanges, three major
points of analysis must be considered. First, Part III.A of this Note
addresses how after the NSMIA the debate surrounding uniformity
appears to be well-settled: the states retain power to prosecute fraud,
and, despite proposed uniform acts, there appears to be little motivation
for states to eradicate inconsistencies among their antifraud
provisions.123
Second, Part III.B discusses the Murphy Court’s
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
118
Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93, at 822.
119
See supra Part II.B (discussing the NSMIA as a response to a lack of uniformity, and
the resulting lack of uniformity vis-à-vis state securities fraud regulation).
120
See supra note 25.
121
See supra Part II.B (discussing the states’ ultimate retention of power to prosecute
fraud, and consequently, the power to construe their fraud provisions as they see fit); see
also Denos, supra note 18, at 105 (discussing how the NSMIA was a step toward uniformity
between the state and federal securities regulation agencies, but because of the deeplyrooted dual regulatory structure, total federal preemption of state law has not been
achieved).
122
See supra Part II.C (explaining Ohio’s Blue Sky Law remedies, specifically how sellers
of stock have no statutory right of rescission when defrauded by a buyer in a stock-forstock exchange).
123
See infra Part III.A.
116
117
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construction of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law in the case of a fraudulent stock-forstock transaction, focusing specifically on the ambiguity in the text of the
statute concerning who is afforded the right of rescission.124 Finally, in
light of the Murphy Court’s willingness to extend Blue Sky protection to
both parties in a stock-for-stock transaction, Part III.C addresses why
Ohio’s Blue Sky statute should be re-formulated to explicitly include
both parties in a stock-for-stock exchange.125 In sum, Part III examines
how the analysis of fraud in a stock-for-stock exchange introduces a set
of circumstances that need to be accounted for in Ohio’s state securities
fraud regulation.126
A. Uniformity: How Has the NSMIA Affected the Uniformity Debate?
Reacting to multiple unsuccessful attempts to overhaul the complex
dual regulatory system of securities regulation, Congress enacted the
NSMIA in 1996.127 Because of the frustrating complexity, those who
supported the NSMIA lauded its attempts to address the patchwork
system that existed under one federal regulatory umbrella.128 To those in
favor of state uniformity, however, the NSMIA’s ultimate effect proved
to be much more form than substance.129 Although the NSMIA
developed under the auspices of encouraging uniformity, certainly its
effect has not been to establish uniformity among all aspects of securities
regulation.130 As a result, commentators on both sides of the uniformity
debate are left unsatisfied.131

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
126
See infra Part III.
127
See supra note 58.
128
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
129
See Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55, at 507 (describing how the NSMIA fell short of a
fundamental reordering because the states retained so much regulatory power); see also
Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58 (explaining that changes are
generally insignificant as the states ultimately retained the most important power—
prosecution of fraud).
130
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (describing precisely what powers were
granted to the states and what powers were left to the SEC).
131
Compare McWilliams, supra note 18 (lauding the benefits of establishing uniformity
between state and federal law, although cautioning that this pursuit should not serve as a
catch-all trump to the unique interests of each state), with Campbell, Jr., Open Attack, supra
note 58 (promoting total preemption because state antifraud laws are essentially the same
as federal laws), Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 (encouraging uniformity among states
because of the time-consuming task involved in analyzing all state blue sky laws when
attempting to ensure that a security issue is in compliance with all applicable state
statutes), Maynard, supra note 54, at 393 (same), and Denos, supra note 18, at 102 (discussing
how many state provisions are at odds with comparable federal provisions).
124
125
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Uniformity: The Arguments on Both Sides of the Debate

The most basic proposition asserted against a uniform system of
federal securities regulation is rooted in Federalism.132 Historically, state
Blue Sky Law was the first type of securities regulations, and by 1933,
every state had such a law.133 Moreover, each state has its own unique
motivation regulating securities in a particular manner.134 Flowing
naturally from these positions is the fear that the federal government
would unnecessarily usurp too much power from the states if it had sole
jurisdiction over securities regulation.135
Additionally, and more
pragmatically, there are necessary limitations on the effectiveness and
prudence of allowing the SEC full regulatory power over the
“tremendously variegated industries in this vast country.”136 Relying on
this practicality argument, those opposed to a uniform system of federal
regulation understand that “reasonabl[e] coordinat[ion] with the federal
legislation[]” is a satisfactory alternative to the “hodgepodge” of state
statutes that flourished prior to any efforts aimed at uniformity.137
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 57–58.
See McWilliams, supra note 18, at 248. McWilliams discusses two reasons for having
two sets of regulations—one historical, one theoretical. Id. First, states had regulations in
place before 1933, the time at which the first federal securities regulation statute was
enacted. Id. Second, the federal securities laws “embody a theory of enforcement different
than that of most state laws[] . . . .” Id. For these reasons, McWilliams argues, it is
necessary to look at both regulatory structures in terms of the other. Id.
134
Sargent, Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55, at 498–99. Sargent, admittedly
cynically, describes state agencies as “cash cows for state general revenues.” Id. at 499. He
notes that it is typical for a state to have a very high ratio of budgets to revenues. Id. As a
result, according to Sargent, there is an economic disincentive for the states to relinquish
regulatory control to the federal government. Id.; see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18,
at 149 (citing a 1984 study that reports in more than 30 jurisdictions Blue Sky Law securities
enforcement has become a primary source of revenue).
135
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that states retained substantial
interest in maintaining jurisdiction over securities regulation, whether it be from a financial
or states’ rights perspective); see also supra note 132 (discussing the federalism concerns of
states).
136
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 59. Loss and Seligman point to the abstract and
theoretical underpinnings of the argument in favor of total uniformity as reasons why the
dual regulatory structure should be maintained. Id. In support of their position, they cite a
study of the SEC for the opinion of those who have experienced the intricacies and
complexities of the regulatory structure first hand: “There has not been and should not be
Federal preemption in the field of securities regulation.” Id. (citing Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 734 (1963)). Loss and Seligman,
speaking from experience, suggest that “[p]erhaps it requires a substantial tenure in
government to appreciate the limitations of government.” LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18,
at 59.
137
Id. The authors appear to be content with this current system of “reasonabl[e]
coordinat[ion]” as a satisfactory middle ground that encompasses aims of both federalism
and post-1956 coordination of state securities regulation. Id.
132
133
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On the other hand, strong support exists for absolute federal
preemption of state securities regulation.138 Eugene Rostow condemns
Justice Brandeis’s federalism argument as supportive of excessive
regulation.139 Moreover, the complexities of the various state regulations
have all but rendered state Blue Sky Law meaningless in effect.140 And
Eugene V. Rostow, Book Review, 62 YALE L.J. 675, 677 (1953). Rostow takes great
issue with the federalism argument posited by Loss and Seligman. Id. Trumpeting the
simplification of “financial practice without weakening the protection of investors[,]”
Rostow concludes that the dual-regulatory structure was needless. Id. In addition, the
former Chairman of the SEC, after his resignation, commented that:
The ‘blue sky’ law had come to have a special meaning—a meaning
full of complexities, surprises, unsuspected liabilities for transactions
normal and usual—in short, a crazy-quilt of state regulations no longer
significant or meaningful in purpose, and usually stultifying in effect,
or just plain useless.
J. Sinclair Armstrong, Comment, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713, 714–15 (1958). It is
clear from this scathing condemnation of the state regulation that Armstrong favored
federal preemption. Id.; see Campbell, Jr., Open Attack, supra note 54, at 575 (noting that
state antifraud regulation should be preempted by federal regulation because of the
similarities between section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 and rule 10b-5 under
the 1934 Act). But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 59 (arguing against Rostow’s
simplification argument by suggesting that the securities regulation field is too complex for
federal preemption). But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 57–58 (quoting New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory[] and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.” Id. Loss & Seligman, commenting on Justice Brandeis’s
admonition of the Court’s willingness to embrace notions of uniformity, comment that
“[a]s a matter of principle, it is difficult to justify the federal government’s telling the states
that they cannot try to protect their citizens beyond the federal disclosure philosophy.” Id.
As the authors point out, however, many who do make this argument do not extend its
application beyond disclosure regulations. Id.
139
See Rostow, supra note 138, at 677 (commenting that securities regulation is an area in
which “multiple regulation by the states and the national government is a monument to the
shibboleth, not the reality, of federalism[]”).
140
See Armstrong, supra note 138. Armstrong extends the uniformity argument to its
logical extreme—total preemption of state regulation. Considering the interest of the
public investor along side the regulatory purpose served by state regulation of securities,
Armstrong concludes that state regulation is meaningless; he views these regulations as
unnecessary interference with the interstate securities markets. Id. at 713–14. As a result,
he posits not an overhaul of state law, but rather federal preemption. Id. at 714.
Armstrong, aware of those in favor of states’ rights who would oppose his rather extreme
argument, finds nothing in his argument that should be opposed by those in favor of states’
rights. Id. According to Armstrong, the process of investment and capital formation is
necessarily national in nature; the investment market is nationwide, and to this end, only
federal regulation should be mandated. Id. at 717. Ultimately, Armstrong supports his
position against state co-ordinate antifraud regulation with the following argument:
Thus the states, exercising their sovereign police power in an economic
area of interstate significance, have distorted their original purpose to
protect their citizens against fraud. Instead they have set up a
138

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7

336

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

as Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. posits, the similarities in statutory
language between the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act and section
101 of the Uniform Securities Act provide convincing evidence for total
preemption.141 From the perspective of one dealing in securities,
working with multiple, varied state statutes entails unnecessary
duplicative work.142
Nevertheless, regardless of one’s position in the uniformity debate,
Blue Sky Law appears to be a fixture in securities regulation.143
Accepting this position, it appears as if the best response to the
uniformity debate is to recognize the dual-regulatory structure as a
reality and to proceed with an optimistic recognition that state and
federal regulation work together, both serving valid regulatory
purposes.144 Indeed, it is clear that strong arguments exist both in favor
of and against uniformity—so strong, in fact, that Congress addressed
the matter by enacting the NSMIA.145 Whether Congress achieved this
goal, however, is a critical point of analysis.146
protective machinery, often based on local interests, which is
completely antithetical to the public interest in free and open corporate
securities markets.
Id. at 718. Therefore the nation-wide scope of the market renders the “appearance of
providing a state’s citizens with protection against investment folly[]” illusory when a
citizen of one state could easily travel to another state, engage in a securities transaction,
and be subject to a different set of fraud statutes. Id.
141
See Campbell, Jr., Open Attack, supra note 54, at 576; see also supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
142
See Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393. As a lawyer with actual experience in the field of
securities regulation, Dahlquist expresses his displeasure with being forced to comply with
multiple, inconsistent statutes:
Only a lawyer who has had the actual experience of qualifying a
security issue in almost all of the . . . states which have some form of
blue-sky law, concurrently with or immediately following registration
under the Securities Act of 1934, has any real comprehension of the
stupendous, tedious and wasteful task involved. It entails a vast
amount of expensive duplicative work, most of which signifies
nothing.
Id.; see also Denos, supra note 18 (admonishing the dual-regulatory structure as a hindrance
when attempting to combat fraud); supra note 59 (discussing the aims of investor protection
and efficiency as supportive of uniformity).
143
See Warren, Merit Regulation, supra note 19. Warren analyzes the history of the state
regulations, and concludes that “[l]egislative and judicial recognition ha[ve] established
and preserved a dual regulatory system.” Id. at 134. In addition to this firm historical
foundation, Warren praises the dual system as assisting to “provide the legitimacy
required for investor participation in the capital formation process.” Id.
144
See Facciolo & Stone, supra note 18 (suggesting that considering federal securities law
concepts when construing state statutory provisions).
145
See S. REP. NO. 104–293, supra note 59, at 39 (the Act was intended to modernize
regulatory scheme, characterized by duplicative and unnecessary regulation); see also
Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 (speaking from the perspective of a lawyer with actual
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Did the NSMIA Achieve Its Goal of Uniformity?

Reacting to the lack of regulatory uniformity that has spawned more
than half a century of fervent debate, Congress set out to eradicate the
inefficiencies caused by the duplicative regulatory structure.147 Prior to
the NSMIA, the arguments in support of Blue Sky Law supported the
complex dual-regulatory scheme.148 Attempting to combat this disarray
and inconsistent regulatory landscape, Congress approved the
legislation.149 Granting the SEC exclusive regulatory powers appeared to
be a step toward the goal of uniformity between the states and the
federal government.150 However, by allowing the states to retain the
power to prosecute fraud, it appears that the NSMIA failed in its goal of
achieving total uniformity.151
One argument, although made prior to the enactment of the NSMIA,
is particularly relevant to this analysis because it champions consistent,
federal antifraud regulation, precisely that which the NSMIA sought to
avoid.152 Campbell, Jr. poses the typical argument in favor of absolute
preemption.153 His reasons include a reduction of unnecessary and
superfluous regulation, as well as a reduction of the economic burdens
created by state variations.154 But while seemingly workable in the
abstract, Campbell, Jr.’s argument fails to account for the practical
experience in the field of securities regulation, the author expresses displeasure with being
forced to comply with multiple, inconsistent statutes).
146
See infra Part III.A.2 (positing that by leaving antifraud regulation with the states, the
NSMIA failed in achieving uniformity between state and federal securities regulation).
147
See S. REP. NO. 104–293 (1996), supra note 59, at 39 (explaining that Congress set out to
promote investment and capital development in response to the ineffective, duplicative
regulatory system).
148
See, e.g., Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55, at 498–99 (noting how both
state governments and state regulators were committed to providing state protection to
investors).
149
See supra notes 57, 59 and accompanying text; see also Denos, supra note 18, at 102
(noting that the NSMIA is a manifestation of strong feelings in favor of a single regulatory
system).
150
See supra note 57 (although regulation of fraud was left to the states, the NSMIA
delegated exclusively to the SEC regulation of certain activities related to the offering,
promotion, and sale of nationally traded securities).
151
See Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55; supra note 59 and accompanying
text.
152
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
153
Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack, supra note 54, at 575 (Campbell, Jr. argues in favor of
absolute preemption because most state antifraud laws are substantially the same as the
federal 10b-5 standard).
154
See id. at 577 (discussing the economic burdens of researching and evaluating
materials in multiple jurisdictions); see also Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 (expressing his
displeasure as a practicing attorney having to comply with multiple, inconsistent statutes);
supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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limitations of such preemption.155 The SEC is simply not capable of
prosecuting all cases of fraud, and Congress consciously reserved these
powers for the states.156
It is clear that the NSMIA’s delegation of antifraud regulation to the
states fell short of uniformity in the eyes of those who argue for absolute
uniformity.157 Nevertheless, the promulgation of the NSMIA made it
clear that a need still exists for some semblance of consistency in the
language of the statutes.158 Consistency among the state fraud statutes
does not require uniform federal regulation, however.159 The arguments
in favor of uniformity, particularly Dahlquist’s position rooted in
economic efficiency, still provide an incentive for consistency in fraud
regulation from state to state.160 What is clear from this debate is that
uniformity among the state regulatory structures is a worthwhile
pursuit, even if not mandated by federal legislation.161
3.

A More Effective Means of Promoting Uniformity—The Uniform
Securities Act of 1956

It is apparent that granting the SEC partial regulatory power has not
proven to be an effective means toward promoting uniformity among
state regulatory agencies.162 Before the NSMIA’s move toward a
uniform, federal regulatory structure, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956
first sought to minimize the diversity that flourished among the various
state Blue Sky Laws.163 The 1956 Act was intended to promote
uniformity in a manner substantially different from the NSMIA.164
155
See supra notes 136–38 (Loss and Seligman argue against preemption by suggesting
that the securities regulation field is too complex for federal preemption).
156
See supra notes 136–38 (Loss and Seligman argue against preemption by suggesting
that the securities regulation field is too complex for federal preemption).
157
See Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55, at 507 (noting how despite the NSMIA’s profound
impact on the state-federal regulatory dichotomy, it surely fell short of a fundamental
reordering); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
158
See S. REP. NO. 104–293, supra note 59, at 39 (the NSMIA was intended to modernize
the regulatory scheme, characterized by unnecessary regulation).
159
See infra Part III.A.3 (discussion of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 as an effective
means of promoting uniformity).
160
See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text; Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393
(emphasizing the practical difficulties of the necessary duplicative work caused by being
forced to comply with multiple, inconsistent statutes.
161
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
162
See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the NSMIA’s shortcomings in promoting uniformity
among state legislation).
163
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
164
See supra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of how, by leaving antifraud
regulation with the states, the NSMIA seemed to achieve the result of dissuading the states
from seeking uniformity. Compare LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 50 (exploring the
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Analyzing this difference between a model act and federal legislation
makes clear that a carefully structured model act does more to encourage
uniformity among the states than legislation that essentially grants the
states free reign in constructing their legislation.165
As a model act, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 operates as a
paradigm of securities regulation intended to better integrate the
regulatory action of states and the SEC.166 After the NSMIA, it is clear
that the fore of this state and federal integration is in the form of
antifraud regulation.167 Thus, it makes perfect sense that the Act
proposed a uniform definition and treatment of fraud.168 Desiring to
embrace this uniform approach, many states have adopted, or have
substantially adopted, the Act’s antifraud provisions.169 Based on the
Uniform Securities Act of 1956, many states have taken affirmative steps
toward adopting uniform antifraud provisions in an effort to minimize
the “burden of their separate legislation on interstate commerce.”170
But in order to achieve its desired ends most effectively, a uniform
act must be either entirely thorough—explicitly enumerating as many
possible contingencies as necessary—or substantially general, so as not
to exclude any possible contingencies.171 A regulatory scheme can
promote uniformity either concerning those aspects of the regulatory
system that it mentions explicitly, or, conversely, by being so general as

inherent impracticalities of expecting complete uniformity among states with different
regulatory philosophies), with Part II.B (discussing how the NSMIA was federal legislation,
and as such, states were not left with the option to choose model legislation).
165
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 50.
166
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (comparing the language of the model act for
states found in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 with the language of federal regulation
10b-5).
167
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
168
See supra notes 44–49 (discussing the model statutory definition of fraudulent practices
in connection with the sale or purchase of a security, sanctions for fraudulent practices, and
precisely who is afforded the protection of these statutes).
169
See supra notes 38–40 (noting that 34 out of the 39 Uniform Securities Act Jurisdictions
have adopted section 101—the general definition of fraudulent practices in connection with
the sale or purchase of a security).
170
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 60; see also supra note 18 (discussing of the
arguments in favor of uniformity both between states and also between state and federal
regulation).
171
See generally Part II.C.3. See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386
(6th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the unique instance of a stock-for-stock exchange in which it is
difficult to determine who is the seller, and thus who is protected by the statute; this
specific instance is not covered by Ohio’s Blue Sky provision); see also Farmer & Feldman,
supra note 93, at 822 (raising the obvious—yet critical—question as to what practical
reasons exist for excluding defrauded sellers or securities?).
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not to exclude implicit contingencies.172
Thus, if truly seeking
consistency, the model act must be able to account for all areas in which
inconsistency is possible.173
Fitting squarely into this assessment is the Uniform Securities Act’s
omission of sellers of securities from the protection of state Blue Sky
antifraud regulation.174 Section 410(a) explicitly limits the statutory
protection of the Act to buyers.175 The Act would have been best served
to preempt the possibility of leaving to state courts the responsibility of
construing common-law seller remedies by simply including them with
the remedies available to sellers.176
Although providing seller protection was not a concern to the
drafters of the 1956 Act, it is nonetheless worth analyzing for two
reasons.177 First, this absence from the regulatory scheme seems to
contravene the goals of uniformity.178 Second, and most important to the
analysis that follows, omitting sellers leaves unnecessary interpretive
discretion to the courts, resulting in potentially inconsistent statutory
construction that could be easily avoided.179 To this end, the remainder
of Part III explores these issues in the framework of the Sixth Circuit

See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The NSMIA delegated to the SEC all aspects
of securities regulation except for regulating fraud, which it specifically excluded. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text. By a similar analysis, model statutes can promote
uniformity only as to those provisions it mentions explicitly; model statutes cannot be
expected to achieve uniformity as to that which is excluded. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
173
See infra Part III.B (discussing, as a case in point, the failure to account for cases in
which it might be difficult to define precisely who is the “purchaser” and who is the
“seller” for purposes of statutory protection).
174
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary) (discussing the limitation to buyers as
appropriate in light of common-law remedies of rescission). The drafters of the Act felt
compelled to limit the protection to buyers because of the common-law and equitable
remedies available to the state courts. Id.; see also supra note 42 (noting that the language of
model section 410(a) excludes sellers from the category of “protected entity[]”).
175
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 65.
176
See infra Parts III.B–C (discussing why sellers should be granted the same statutory
remedies as buyers).
177
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary).
178
See McWilliams, supra note 18, at 253 n.53 (noting that the purpose behind the
Uniform Securities Act of 1956 was to promote uniformity in the interpretation and
administration of state regulation); see also supra note 172 and accompanying text
(discussing how the omission of buyers necessarily hinders uniformity by inviting
inconsistent judicial interpretation).
179
See supra Sections II.C.2–3 (discussing the issue of potentially inconsistent judicial
interpretation in the context of the Murphy decision).
172
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Court’s interpretation of who is afforded statutory relief under Ohio Blue
Sky Law in the case of a stock-for-stock exchange.180
B. The Murphy Court’s Broad Interpretation of Available Statutory Remedies
Due to an “Unforeseen Variation in Factual Circumstances”
To probe how Ohio’s Blue Sky Law regulates a stock-for-stock
exchange, this Note explores Ohio case law interpretation of the
reasoning behind Ohio’s Blue Sky statutes.181 Although the language is
not fashioned after the model statute, Ohio’s fraud remedy statute
operates similarly.182 Both statutes provide a statutory cause of action
exclusively to buyers of securities, and both statutes neglect to provide
such relief to sellers in such transactions.183 Thus, based on the plain
meaning of these statutes, sellers and buyers are granted substantially
different avenues of relief.184 In order to unravel the meaning of this
subtle distinction it is necessary to examine further the rationale behind
Ohio’s Blue Sky statutes.185
See infra Parts III.B–C.
See United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966) (“The power of the State to
provide for the general welfare authorizes it to establish such regulations as will secure or
tend to secure the people against ignorance often due from an incomplete disclosure of
facts by one in the unique position to know the facts.”); Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co.,
Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio 1968) (“[T]he purpose . . . is to prevent those persons willing
to market worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the purchasing public
without first subjecting themselves and their securities to reasonable licensing and
registration requirements designed to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility
and avariciousness.”).
182
Compare UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65.
Section 410(a) permits a buyer to sue either at law or in equity to
recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at
six per cent per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable
attorney’s fees, less the amount of any income received on the security,
upon the tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security.
Id., with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly) which provides, in pertinent part: “(A) Subject to divisions (B) [statute of
limitations,] and (C) [correction of error by seller], every sale or contract for sale made in
violation of Chapter 1707 of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the purchaser.”
Id. (emphasis added).
183
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
184
See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93;
supra note 94.
185
See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary); see also infra Part III.C (discussing sections
1707.43’s limitation to purchasers of securities in light of the statute’s purpose of protecting
individuals from incomplete disclosure of facts by one in a unique position to know all the
facts).
180
181
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Just as with statutory interpretation, much can be gleaned from the
chosen language of the courts. In United States v. Tehan, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals discussed the reasons for the antifraud provisions,
referring to aims of “secur[ing] the people against ignorance often due
from an incomplete disclosure of facts by one in the unique position to
know the facts.”186 In Tehan, the court does not distinguish between
buyers and sellers regarding who needs protection of the laws; rather,
the court specifically refers to protecting “the people . . . from an
incomplete disclosure of the facts[.]”187 Additionally, the Tehan Court
does not limit its analysis to either buyers or sellers, thereby not
foreclosing the possibility that a seller, too, could be in a “unique
position” of not knowing all the facts.188 Moreover, in Holderman v.
Columbus Skyline, the Ohio Supreme Court found it necessary to construe
the fraud statute broadly because it determined that the statute was
drafted “to address unforeseen variations in factual circumstances.”189 It
is apparent that the broad interpretation and application of Ohio’s Blue
Sky antifraud statutes, combined with the judicial recognition of the
potential for unforeseen variations, support the contention that sellers,
too, should be afforded statutory causes of action—or at the very least
these judicial interpretations support the argument that the exclusion of

United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966).
Id.
188
Id. But when the buyer is “purchasing” from the seller by means of a stock, the
positions are in essence reversed, placing the seller in the “unique position” of not knowing
all the facts pertaining to the tendered security. See Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp.,
498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007):
Under the circumstances of the exchange of stock between the parties
to this action, we hold that plaintiffs should be regarded as purchasers
for purposes of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law. ‘The sale of a security . . . means
among other things an exchange of securities, and as one who acquires
by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who acquires by an
exchange of securities.’
Id. (quoting Indem Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934); see
also Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1968). Bronaugh cites the
following as the purpose of the antifraud provisions: “[T]o prevent those persons willing
to market worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the purchasing
public . . . and . . . to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility and
avariciousness.” Id. This is clearly language referencing a seller taking advantage of the
purchasing public. However, this language does not prevent a broad interpretation of the
statute; indeed, both the seller and the buyer could potentially market worthless or
unnecessarily risky securities for sale, or as a means of purchase. But see supra note 3 and
accompanying text (noting that the majority of securities fraud cases involve the seller as
the party in the unique position of knowing all the facts).
189
Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660
N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ohio 1996); see Geyer, supra note 69 (providing support of the Columbus
Skyline Court’s decision to affirm the state’s expansive reach regarding fraud prosecution).
186
187
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sellers should not preclude them from being afforded the same statutory
remedies as buyers.190
It was not until the 2007 Murphy decision that such an unforeseen
variation in the typical securities transaction tested the breadth of Ohio’s
Blue Sky antifraud statute.191 Based on the precedent set forth herein,
both the Ohio state courts and the federal courts appeared willing to
construe the antifraud regulation in the Ohio Blue Sky Law as broadly as
they saw fit in the particular situation, bearing in mind the possibility of
an unforeseen variation.192 But in a move seemingly contrary to the
judicial reasoning of prior cases interpreting Ohio Blue Sky Law, the
Northern District of Ohio did not construe section 1707.43 broadly;
rather, the court strictly adhered to the plain language of the statute.193
Applying the unambiguous language of section 1707.43, the district
court concluded that the Plaintiffs—determined by the court to be the
sellers in the stock transaction—were not entitled to rescission under
section 1707.43.194 Following the precedent of prior decisions such as
Nickels, the district court applied the language of section 1707.43 to the
facts—Plaintiffs did not “purchase” stock, and therefore, they were not
See infra Part IV (for this Note’s proposed model statute and commentary).
Murphy, 498 F.3d 386.
192
See, e.g., Columbus Skyline, 660 N.E.2d at 429 (holding that broad statutory language is
essential in order to account for unforeseen situations); see also supra Sections II.C.1–3.
193
Murphy v. Stargate Defense Corp., No. 1:05 CV 2121, 2006 WL 721746, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 21, 2006), aff’d in part, denied in part, 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007). In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir.
1976) for the well-settled interpretation of section 1707.43 that the law “provides a remedy
only for a defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller.” Murphy, 2006 WL 721746
at *12 n.1.
194
Id. at *12. Surprisingly, and maybe most telling of the subtlety of the issue, is the fact
that the court simply concluded the following without much analysis: “The March 18, 2005
transaction must be excluded from Plaintiffs’ claims under the Ohio Blue Sky Law because
Plaintiffs were sellers in the last transaction and the Ohio Blue Sky Law does not provide a
remedy for defrauded sellers. Id. The only legal reasoning undertaken by the court was in
a footnote. See id. at *12 n.1. In this footnote, the court addresses the buyer/seller
distinction in a stock-for-stock exchange and follows the plain meaning of the statute:
While neither party has addressed this issue, the Court’s research
indicates that Ohio’s blue sky law provides a remedy only for a
defrauded purchaser, not for a defrauded seller. In this case, Plaintiffs
were purchasers in the first two stock purchases on January 25, 2002
and February 4, 2002. Plaintiffs were the sellers in the stock-for-stock
transaction on March 18, 2005. Accordingly, their only recourse as
defrauded sellers in the March 18, 2005 transaction is their federal
cause of action under 10b-5 and their state law claim for common law
fraud.
Id. (emphasis added). In so reasoning, the court references Nickels, most likely for the
proposition of the unambiguous standard that the “law provides a remedy only for a
defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller.” Nickels, 541 F.2d at 616.
190
191
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entitled to the rescission provision of section 1707.43.195 But this surface
analysis of the stock-for-stock exchange, although it is consistent with
the statutory language, is nevertheless inconsistent with the purpose of
the statute, as well as the interpretation of this purpose by Ohio courts.196
As these courts have reasoned, the definition of a “purchaser” should be
construed broadly to include one who acquires by an exchange of
securities.197 Indeed, it is this tension that proved to be the source of the
Sixth Circuit court’s disagreement with the district court.198
Fortunately for the Plaintiffs in Murphy, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals undertook a more critical analysis of section 1707.43’s exclusion
of sellers.199 The court’s reasoning went beyond a cursory analysis of
section 1707.43 and supported Plaintiff’s argument that because the deal
was a trade, both parties acted as purchasers.200 Looking to the purpose
of Ohio Blue Sky Law, and specifically the unique nature of the
transaction, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs should be treated as
purchasers.201 The reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court is twofold: first,
the purpose of the Blue Sky Law is to prevent the advertising of
worthless securities; second, with this purpose in mind, the Court
proceeded to apply a prior interpretation of an Ohio appellate court to
this unique factual situation in order to give section 1707.43 an equitable
interpretation.202
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit court reached the proper result in
Murphy, in spite of section 1707.43’s omission of an explicit right of
rescission to a defrauded seller in a stock-for-stock exchange.203
Reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit court reasoned that both
parties were purchasers and provided a section 1707.43 right of
rescission to Plaintiffs; this Note, however, ultimately contends that this
interpretation is unnecessary because the rationale for providing the
right of rescission to sellers in certain circumstances is the same as the
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
197
See Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007); Indem.
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (“The sale of a
security[] . . . means among other things an exchange of securities, and as one who acquires
by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who acquires by an exchange of securities.”).
198
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 390.
201
Id.; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
202
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 390; see also United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir.
1966) (holding that the purpose of the statute is to protect the party who is not in the
unique position to know the facts.).
203
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly); Murphy, 498 F.3d 386.
195
196
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original rationale for providing the right to purchasers.204 To this end,
Part III.C of this Note further explores how a stock-for-stock exchange
demands a more comprehensive construction of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law.205
C. The Argument for Inclusion:
Necessary

Why the Murphy Reasoning Is Not

An analysis of the parties in a stock-for-stock exchange leads to the
conclusion that the distinction between buyer and seller is
unnecessary.206
Based on the legislative history and case law
interpreting section 1707.43, it is clear that the intent was to protect less
knowledgeable individuals from predatory acts of more savvy and
sophisticated persons.207 Most often, this situation is present in the form
of an unsophisticated buyer purchasing from a savvy, knowledgeable,
and potentially predatory seller.208 As a result, section 1707.43 is
structured specifically with these types of transactions in mind.209
Notwithstanding its general applicability to these standard transactions,
the language of section 1707.43 has proven ineffective in carrying out its
purpose to the fullest extent possible.210
In a stock-for-stock exchange, one party acquires stock from another
party in exchange for stock.211 Just like a transaction involving a buyer
and a seller, the stock exchange can be viewed from the perspective of
which party is in a better position to know all the facts.212 With a buyer
and a seller, most often the seller is in the best position to know all the
facts; therefore, it follows that the buyer is most likely to be a victim of
fraud.213 Returning to the case of a stock exchange, however, there is
Murphy, 498 F.3d 386; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.
206
See infra Part III.C; see also infra Part IV The author of this Note’s commentary to the
proposed model statute).
207
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
208
See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
209
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly).
210
United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966) (holding that the regulations
were intended to provide for the “general welfare . . . secur[ing] the people against
ignorance often due from an incomplete disclosure of facts by one in the unique position to
know the facts.”); see also Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus
Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1996) (creating broad, sweeping statutory language
was necessary in order to address potential unforeseen variations).
211
See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I (describing a stock-forstock exchange modeled after the facts in Murphy).
212
See Tehan, 365 F.2d at 194 (differentiating the parties to a transaction based on one
party’s “unique position to know the facts.”).
213
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that sellers of securities are the most
common perpetrators of fraud).
204
205
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nothing inherent in the dynamics of the transaction that makes one party
more likely to be a victim of fraud. Because the transaction is structured
as an exchange, whereby either party could be more knowledgeable or
vulnerable, it is in furtherance of public policy to grant both parties the
right of rescission when one party becomes aware that the other party is
acting fraudulently. Indeed, section 1707.43 would be most fulfilling of
its purposes either by explicitly including the right of rescission for both
buyers and sellers, or accounting for the instance of a stock-for-stock
exchange, and therefore eliminating the need to delineate remedies
based on a characterization of “buyer” or “seller.”214
Moreover, there seems to be little logic in limiting the applicability of
the right of rescission in a stock-for-stock transaction.215 It is clear from
both the legislative intent and case law that the statute was meant to
enjoy a broad construction.216
Moreover, public policy dictates
protecting those investors who might be less knowledgeable than those
in whom they are investing, regardless of whether they are considered to
be a buyer or a seller.217 Despite the fact that buyers are most often the
defrauded party, this generality should not limit the breadth of a statute
meant to serve equitable measures.218 In the end, this distinction has
little basis in logic.219
Ultimately, section 1707.43 needs to be amended to include all
parties that could be victimized by fraud. For the courts, this statutory
clarification will remove the need for abhorring equity at the altar of
strict statutory interpretation, and will further eliminate the need for
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93, at 822 (wondering why, because misstatements
and omissions can just as easily induce a sale as a purchase, does the statute not provide a
civil remedy for defrauded sellers?).
216
See Geyer, supra note 69, at 301 n.1 (quoting Ohio State Bar Association Corporation
Law Committee Comments Accompanying the 1929 Amendments to the Ohio Securities
Act, reprinted in HOWARD FRIEDMAN, OHIO SECURITIES LAW & PRACTICE 23 (Supp. 1994))
(noting that the broad, inclusive powers given to the Division of Securities will enable
discovery, prevention, and punishment of fraud). See United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191,
194 (6th Cir. 1966) (holding that the regulations were intended to combat incomplete
disclosure by protecting those parties not in the best position to know all the facts); see also
Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660
N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1996) (creating broad statutory language to account for unconsidered
situations).
217
See Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1968) (holding that
the purpose of securities regulation is to protect the public from acquiring securities that
might be worthless or unnecessarily risky).
218
See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Columbus Skyline, 660 N.E.2d 427
(holding that the securities statute should be construed broadly, so as not to exclude
potentially fraudulent conduct).
219
See Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93 (noting that there is no reason for preventing
sellers of securities from having a statutory remedy for fraud).
214
215
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legal analysis aimed at achieving a desired result.220 Therefore, section
1707.43 of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law should be amended to clarify the law,
and ultimately give effect to the original intended purposes of the
legislation.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43
[A]s one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who acquires
by an exchange of securities.221
Ohio’s Blue Sky Law was enacted to provide statutory relief to a
party defrauded in a securities transaction.222 In interpreting the
language of Ohio Blue Sky statutes, the Ohio Supreme Court has
suggested construing the statute broadly in order to “address unforeseen
variations in factual circumstances[,]” and ultimately not to exclude
potentially fraudulent conduct.223 In tension with this judicial guidance
is the clear language of section 1707.43, which provides the right of
rescission only to “purchasers” of securities.224 Illustrative of this tension
is the case of rescission of a stock-for-stock exchange, in which the
parties do not fit squarely into the buyer-seller framework of section
1707.43.225 To account for this unforeseen variation not provided for in
the statute, this Note proposes an amendment to section 1707.43 in an
effort to include both parties to a stock-for-stock exchange.226
Section 1707.43 should not limit the right of rescission to buyers of
securities.227 To realize the full extent of its purpose, section 1707.43
should include both parties to account for fraud perpetrated in a stockfor-stock exchange.228 The amended statute appears as follows, with the
author’s commentary inserted throughout:

See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Def. Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007).
Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934).
222
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
223
See Columbus Skyline, 600 N.E.2d at 429.
224
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly); see Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1976)
(interpreting the statutory right of rescission under section 1707.43 as follows: “The blue
sky law provides a remedy only for a defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller[]”)
(emphasis added).
225
See, e.g., Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.
226
See infra notes 227–48.
227
§ 1707.43 (“[E]very sale or contract for sale made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the
Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the purchaser.”) (emphasis added).
228
See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
220
221
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Proposed Amendment to OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.43229
(A) Every sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of
securities made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the
Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the
purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange of
securities. The person making such sale, or contract for
sale, or exchange of securities, and every person who
has participated in or aided the seller in any way in
making such sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of
securities, are jointly and severally liable to such
purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange of
securities, in an action at law in any court of competent
jurisdiction, upon tender to the seller in person or in
open court of the securities sold or exchanged, or of the
contract made, for the full amount paid by such
purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange of
securities and for all taxable court costs, unless the court
determines that the violation did not materially affect
the protection contemplated by the voided provision.
Commentary
First, by expanding the scope of the statute from “sale” to “sale or
exchange of securities,” the proposed amendment clarifies its
applicability to a stock-for-stock exchange.230 This clarification will
ultimately free the courts from the burden of having to determine
whether the right of rescission applies to a stock-for-stock exchange.231
Second, and most importantly, adding after “purchaser” the phrase “or
one who acquires by an exchange of securities” will allow for the
inclusion of both parties to a stock-for-stock exchange.232 No longer will
the courts be forced to categorize parties in order to determine the
applicability of the statute.233 As a result of this change, no longer will
229
The proposals are the contributions of the author. Proposed additions are underlined,
and proposed deletions are struck out. The language in regular font is taken from
§ 1707.43.
230
See § 1707.43. See also Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1934). Here, the Court was forced to categorize a stock-for-stock exchange as a sale.
Id. The court reasoned, “The sale of a security . . . means among other things an exchange
of securities, and as one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who
acquires by and exchange of securities.” Id.
231
See supra note 220.
232
See § 1707.43.
233
See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Def. Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007).
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the right of rescission in a stock-for-stock exchange be limited to the
party determined by the court to be the “purchaser.”234
(B) No action for the recovery of the purchase price or
rescission of the exchange as provided for in this section,
and no other action for any recovery based upon or
arising out of a sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of
securities made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the
Revised Code, shall be brought more than two years
after the plaintiff knew, or had reason to know, of the
facts by reason of which the actions of the person or
director were unlawful, or more than four years from
the date of such sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of
securities, whichever is the shorter period.
(C) No purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange
of securities is entitled to the benefit of this section who
has failed to accept, within thirty days from the date of
such offer, an offer in writing made after two weeks
from the date of such sale, or contract of sale, or
exchange of securities, by the seller or by any person
who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in
making such sale, or contract of sale, or exchange of
securities, to take back the security in question and to
refund the full amount paid by such purchaser or void
the exchange of securities.
Commentary
In the second and third sections of proposed section 1707.43, the
changes made to proposed section 1707.43(A) have been incorporated.235
Additionally, the right to “refund the full amount paid by such
purchaser” has been supplemented with the option to “void the
exchange of securities.”236 In parts (B) and (C), the proposed amendment
seeks to expand the right of rescission that was limited to a purchaser of
securities to both parties in a stock-for-stock exchange.237

234
See id. Constrained by the limitation of section 1707.43 to purchasers of securities, the
Court in Murphy was forced to reason that, in a stock-for-stock exchange, one party
effectively purchases shares from the other corporation. Id. at 391.
235
See supra notes 230–34.
236
See § 1707.43.
237
See supra notes 206–20.
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Opponents of the proposed amendment are likely to make the
following arguments. First, states have the police power to regulate
securities fraud as they see fit, so why should Ohio broaden its statute?238
Second, because the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 does not extend
statutory protection to sellers, why should Ohio Blue Sky Law?239 Third,
if the statute does not provide an explicit right of rescission, why not
pursue common law remedies that are already in place?240 Each of these
arguments is addressed in turn.
The first argument can be attacked simply by looking to the intent of
Ohio Blue Sky Law, and determining that limiting the right of rescission
contravenes the goal of broad, sweeping applicability vis-à-vis
regulating fraud.241 Second, relying on section 410 of the 1956 Act
simply begs the question.242 Third, forcing one party to resort to
common law remedies necessitates an inherent distinction between the
two parties, and this Note contends that there is no logical reason for
providing the right of rescission to one party but not the other in a stockfor-stock exchange.243 Moreover, it is the party in the position not likely
to be aware of all the facts that should be afforded the statutory right of
rescission, and in the case of a stock-for-stock exchange, either party can
potentially assume this position.244
Ultimately, this proposed amendment to section 1707.43 would
eliminate the need for such judicial reasoning found in the quote at the
heading of this section.245 No longer will courts be forced to construe
parties to a stock-for-stock exchange as either a “purchaser” or a

238
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Speaking to the state and federal regulation uniformity debate, Justice Brandeis noted that
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[,] and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.” Id.
239
See supra notes 46–47.
240
See Geyer, Miglets, & Rowley, supra note 89, at 941 (noting that Ohio common law
supplements the Securities Act with attractive alternatives in the form of state common law
fraud claims); Matia, supra note 89 (discussing the various remedies available to parties in
securities transactions).
241
See supra notes 79, 83.
242
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 18, at 65; see also supra note 80 (noting that Ohio is not a Uniform Securities Act
jurisdiction; and consequently, it has used more expansive language pertaining to fraud).
243
See supra notes 215–19.
244
See United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that states should
provide regulations that “tend to secure the people against ignorance often due from an
incomplete disclosure of facts by one in the unique position to know the facts[]”) (emphasis
added).
245
See supra note 221.
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“seller.”246 As a result, no longer will such parties seeking rescission
under section 1707.43 find the fate of their claim in the hands of judicial
interpretation.247 The proposed amendments to section 1707.43 will
expand the applicability of the statute, both fulfilling the original intent
of Ohio Blue Sky Law and eliminating the possibility of inconsistent
judicial interpretation.248
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to the rescission claims set forth in Part I, B’s suit against
A in state court for rescission of a stock-for-stock exchange under current
section 1707.43 will likely be successful, but surely not guaranteed.249
Likewise, after the Murphy court clarified the issue, Z’s suit against Y in
federal court will also likely be successful.250 Unfortunately for both B
and Z, to rescind statutorily a stock-for-stock exchange under current
section 1707.43, the court must first find that they are each a “purchaser”
of securities.251 Inconsistent judicial interpretation should not be
determinative; both B and Z are entitled to the assurance that the right of
rescission will be available to them under the statute. For this reason, it
is clear that section 1707.43 needs to be amended to expand the scope of
its applicability.
It would be naïve to expect statutes to account for the potentiality of
all unforeseen variations in factual circumstances. If this were the case,
then our judiciary would cease to function as an interpreter of the law.
However, it is through judicial interpretation that the law grows and
develops. If the courts find vagueness or ambiguity in the language,
then the legislature needs to amend its language. In the case of remedies
available to a defrauded party in a stock-for-stock exchange, Ohio courts
See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Def. Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007).
See supra Part III.C (describing how courts have interpreted the language of Ohio’s
Blue Sky Law, specifically the rescission provision of section 1707.43).
248
See supra Part IV.
249
See Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1976) (“The blue sky law
provides a remedy only for a defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller.”). But if
the state court were to abide by the instructions of the Columbus Skyline Court to construe
the statute broadly in order “to address unforeseen variations in factual circumstances[,]” it
would likely find that B is entitled to the right of rescission. Holderman, Comm’r v.
Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 N.E.2d 427, 429 (Ohio 1996).
250
498 F.3d at 391 (“[P]laintiffs should be regarded as purchasers for purposes of Ohio’s
Blue Sky Law . . . . The sale of a security . . . means among other things an exchange of
securities, and as one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who
acquires by an exchange of securities.”) (quoting Indem Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191
N.E.374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934)).
251
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th
Gen. Assembly).
246
247
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have spoken. After the Murphy Court’s analysis of section 1707.43, it is
clear that the statute needs to be amended.
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